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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis investigates how China and the United States used state sovereignty 
in their official statements provided to the United Nations Security Council when 
discussing the Darfur conflict during the time period between 2004 and 2009. The 
thesis looks in particular at the official statements made with regards to the three 
different measures taken by the Security Council which were: the implementation of 
sanctions, the referral to the international criminal court and the deployment of 
peacekeeping. The thesis found that China applied a more cautious, but consistent, 
approach in which breaches of state sovereignty were never officially supported. The 
United States use of state sovereignty evolved as it became more willing over time to 
breach the sovereign rights of Sudan. The investigation into the official stance by China 
and the United States also provides general conclusions with regard to state sovereignty 
in contemporary international relations. First, the thesis finds that state sovereignty is 
still at the core of decision making in the United Nations Security Council, and as well 
in international relations, and there no present challenges to the role state sovereignty in 
contemporary international relations. Nonetheless, the different interpretations applied 
by states such as China and the United States, delays the decision-making process as 
states disagree on justifiable breaches of state sovereignty. State authorizes, such as the 
Government of Sudan, use state sovereignty as a barrier to effective international action 
to prevent atrocities and heinous crimes against humanity. In this application of state 
sovereignty, the rights of nation -states are protected more than the individual rights of 
human beings.  
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1. STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
State sovereignty is not only described as the key building block of international 
law, but the key building block of international relations. The main principle of state 
sovereignty is the notion that nation states have the authority to govern their people and 
their territory without any interference from other nation states. Small and large states are 
alike in that they have equal rights and have no external authority over them. The notions 
of territorial sovereignty, equality and non-interference are all enshrined in the United 
Nations Charter of Human Rights, which enforces the state-centered system of 
international relations. Nevertheless, the main principles of state sovereignty are being 
challenged given a quickly evolving international environment.  
Since the creation of the Charter in 1945, 150 nation states, many non-state actors 
and also trans-national organizations have entered the world stage. New state borders 
have been created, while others have been lost or changed. Conflicts have shifted from 
occurring between countries to occurring within countries. There has not only been a 
change of the international environment, but also to the ideas that shape international 
relations and the state-centered system. Human security has provided a challenge to 
sovereignty as a key focus area as individual security has been placed ahead of state 
security in importance, and that individual protection can come from within a state or 
beyond a state’s borders. Human rights advocates are pressing for a new agenda that 
shifts from the traditional state system to one of state accountability not only to its own 
people and territory, but also to the world. It is difficult to determine the impact that the 
challenging environment and new ideas might have had on state sovereignty. One way to 
understand how state sovereignty has been affected is to look at how nation states are 
using state sovereignty to address contemporary international relations.  
Some nation states are considered more powerful than others given their influence 
and political persuasion in international relations. Two examples are China and the 
United States where the United States is often referred to as the hegemonic super power 
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because of its economic and military strength, with China fast becoming a contender.1 On 
a regular basis their geopolitical, economic and military strengths are compared and 
analyzed by academics. Examples of comparisons include everything from the size of 
military expenditures and economic growth to resource extraction in Africa. While 
economic comparisons are on the rise, there have been few comparative analyses of 
adherence to international laws and ethics, or the consideration of state sovereignty in 
international relations.  
While China and the United States have robustly defended the significant role of 
state sovereignty in international relations, they have nonetheless taken a different 
approach on how it should be applied. The United States is often accused by academics 
of having a definition of state sovereignty that is constantly shifting to suit unique 
situations. China, on the other hand, has been criticized for having a rigid and traditional 
definition of state sovereignty that does not take into consideration some of the recent 
changes in international relations. China and the United States provide excellent 
examples of the complexities involved with the application of international law where 
there is no higher authority to enforce one set of rules. This is a reflection of the reality of 
international law where nation states have the liberty of interpretation and integration into 
domestic judicial systems. Under such a system, there are several definitions of state 
sovereignty which result in differing interpretations and applications within each foreign 
policy.  
There is no better case study to reflect the complexities of state sovereignty in 
contemporary international relations than the Darfur conflict in Sudan. The circumstances 
of the conflict challenge many aspects of state sovereignty. In the case of Darfur, the 
Sudanese government is not only unwilling to protect its own population against human 
rights abuses, but has been found guilty as a perpetrator of crimes against humanity. The 
international community has been reserved in reacting to such atrocities, given that the 
Government of Sudan has repeatedly demanded that its rights as a sovereign state must 
be respected.   
                                                        
1 Ted C. Fishman, China Inc: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America the World (New 
York: Scribner, 2006) 296.  
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In response to the atrocities in Darfur, the United Nations Security Council (the 
Security Council) has passed twenty-five resolutions between 2004 and 2009 that have 
included sanctions against the perpetrators, referrals of the atrocities to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and the deployment of a United Nations and African Union hybrid 
peacekeeping force. These three distinct decisions, if implemented in their entirety, will 
weaken the Sudanese government’s sovereignty. In effect, the discussions in relation to 
the resolutions include many debates and statements on the topic of state sovereignty. As 
permanent members of the Security Council, China and the United States have been at 
the centre of the deliberation and decision-making concerning the resolutions. 
Nonetheless, China and the United States have been on opposite sides of the arguments. 
China has argued against any intrusive actions against the Government of Sudan, while 
the United States has initiated several of the resolutions that could weaken the authority 
of the Government of Sudan.  
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate how China and the United States 
used state sovereignty in their official statements provided to the Security Council when 
discussing the Darfur Conflict during the period between 2004 and 2009. The thesis will 
also investigate different approaches to state sovereignty. Specifically, do different 
definitions of state sovereignty explain the differences between country’s political 
positions - and, how do different approaches affect the Security Council and influence its 
effectiveness in responding to the Darfur conflict? I will investigate and compare the 
arguments presented by China and the United States for state sovereignty in the case 
study of Darfur between 2004 and 2009 to provide insight into how state sovereignty is 
interpreted in contemporary international relations.  
The thesis will begin with a discussion of the main principles of state sovereignty 
as they are codified into international law, with a particular focus on the United Nations 
Charter. Furthermore, the thesis will investigate how China and the United States have 
integrated the main principles of state sovereignty into their foreign policies and 
international activities. The introduction will also include a brief introduction to the role 
of China and the United States as permanent members in the United Nations Security 
Council.   
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Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to the conflict in Darfur that will serve as 
the case study for this thesis. The main focus of this chapter is to review the response to 
the conflict by the Security Council with a focus on China and the United States. 
Additionally, the chapter will review the resolutions and the main decision-making 
positions within the Security Council. In effect, this chapter will provide a synopsis of 
conflict and the international environment within which China and the United States 
adopted their foreign policies.  
The next three chapters will examine how China and the United States used state 
sovereignty in the resolution decision-making process. The chapters will be divided by 
the three different types of resolutions: implementing sanctions, referral to the 
international criminal court and the deployment of a peacekeeping force. The chapters 
will examine official statements and actions taken by China and the United States 
pertaining to each of the three different types of resolutions, and how state sovereignty 
played a role in their decision-making.  
The conclusion will provide an analysis of the official positions of China and the 
United States in a case study of the Darfur conflict, and will provide observations based 
on the analysis about the role of state sovereignty in contemporary international relations 
and how it relates to the effectiveness of the Security Council.  
 
1.2 Introduction to International Law and State Sovereignty  
International law consists of two different parts: customary international law and 
codified international law. Customary international law is an informal, unwritten body of 
rules that originates from the practice of states together with a shared belief that the 
practice is required by law or an international norm.2 The codification of international 
law is the formalization process of customary international law into treaties or quasi 
contractual written documents by two or more states and a registered third party.3 The 
treaty that prevails over all others is the United Nations Charter of 1945 that has been 
                                                        
2 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, “Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral humanitarian 
intervention and future of International Law” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas. Eds. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
179.  
3 Ibid.  
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adopted by 192 states. The cornerstone of the Charter, to which all signatories have 
agreed, is state sovereignty (Article 2.1).4 
The notion of sovereignty was first introduced to international law through the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 in an effort to establish international order and peace in 
Europe after decades of war. The Treaty of Westphalia spoke to the supremacy of 
sovereign authority within the state. All sovereign authorities were to be independent of 
each other while at the same time equal.5 The notion of sovereign authorities evolved into 
sovereign nation states. According to the Montevideo Convention of 1933, the 
requirements for sovereignty are a permanent population, a defined territory and a 
functioning government.6 These basic principles of state sovereignty were codified into 
the UN Charter along with an understanding on how it should be enforced in international 
relations. 
According to the UN Charter, the main purpose of the UN is to maintain 
international peace and security by developing “friendly relations among nations based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” (Article 
1.2).7 In achieving this purpose, the UN will act as a “centre for harmonizing the actions 
of nations” (Article 1.3).8 To obtain its purpose, the Charter obliges its members to 
respect that all members are sovereign equals (Article 2.1). All conflicts should be settled 
so not to disrupt international peace and security (Article 2.3), and at no time shall 
members use “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state” (Article 2.4).9 In its Charter, the UN and its members, have in 
essence agreed to a set of fundamental principles of state sovereignty; equality of rights 
among states, non-interference into internal affairs, and mutual respect for all sovereign 
states. If these fundamental principles are respected, states will peacefully coexist. 
In 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance 
                                                        
4 The United Nations Charter (1945), available on-line: at www.un.org/aboutun/charter, last used April 28, 
2009. 
5 ICISS (supplement volume) p. 6 
6 Ibid.  
7 UN Charter. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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with the Charter of the United Nations (Resolution 2625).  This Declaration placed the 
following principles of state sovereignty at the core of international law: 
1. The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations, 
2. The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means 
in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not 
endangered, 
3. The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, 
in accordance with the Charter, 
4. The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter, 
5. The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
6. The principle of sovereign equality of States,10 
 
After the completion of the Declaration, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reflected 
that these principles of state sovereignty were the foundation on which “the whole of 
international law rests.” 11  
The Charter prohibits the UN to “intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state,” (Article 2.7)12 but also provides a legal loophole 
for intervention in Chapter VII. If there is a threat to, or a breach of international peace 
and security, the Security Council has the authority to make recommendations or decide 
to take certain measures (Article 39).  Article 41 gives the Security Council the authority 
to evoke non-military measures, such as economic sanctions, communication end (travel 
ban) or severance of diplomatic relations, while Article 42 gives the Security Council the 
authority to impose military measures. Security Council resolutions are legally binding 
on all members of the UN, and all members can be asked to provide certain resources and 
support to implement a resolution.  
The Charter does not provide the Security Council with any directions regarding 
which acts qualify as threats to international peace and security, or guidelines for how to 
impose measures. As noted by Edward C. Luck, the wording of Chapter VII gives the 
                                                        
10 Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,459d17822,459d17a82,3dda1f104,0.html  
11 ICISS, 6.  
12 UN Charter. 
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Security Council the flexibility to “pick the cases, the timing and the tools for its 
intervention.”13 Unfortunately, the Security Council’s track record in responding to 
international peace and security threats has been “spotty at best,”14 according to Luck. 
But regardless of the “spotty” track record, the Security Council continues to be the 
highest approved international governance body delegated with the powers to protect or 
override the sovereignty of a state.  
 
1.3 Challenges to State Sovereignty in the 21st Century 
From 1946 to 2002, the Security Council evoked Chapter VII in 268 resolutions.15 
During the Cold War period, the Security Council tried to isolate itself from confronting 
issues of human rights concerns or possible humanitarian intervention. As noted by 
Adam Roberts, “interventions and proposals for intervention by either superpower or 
their allies were viewed as suspect on both legal and prudent grounds.”16 The few 
resolutions that were brought forth in the Security Council were usually not contentious, 
and few resolutions were vetoed. When the Cold War ended, the Security Council 
became increasingly concerned with threats to international peace and security, including 
the violations of human rights.17 Throughout the 1990s, the Security Council evoked its 
Chapter VII powers for human rights violations and humanitarian disasters threatening 
international peace and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia and other locations. In these resolutions the Security Council identified refugee 
flows, human suffering, ethnic cleansing, international terrorism, and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) proliferation as threats to international peace and security.18 The 
broadening interpretation of what a threat to international peace and order might be has 
been seen as a challenge to state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. 
                                                        
13 Luck, 22-23.  
14 Luck, 3.  
15 Patrick Johansson. UN Security Council Chapter VII Resolutions 1946-2992: An Inventory. Uppsala: 
Department of Peace and Conflict Research (2003).  
16 Sir Adam Roberts, “UN and Humanitarian Intervention” in Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Relations, ed. By Jennifer Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2004) 78.  
17 Julie A. Mertus. The United Nations and Human Rights: A Guide for A New Era (New York: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2005) 115.  
18 Ibid, 124-125. 
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Nonetheless, the changing interpretation of what is a threat to international peace was 
also a reflection of an evolving international environment.  
The Thirty Years of War from 1618 to 1648 brought huge numbers of casualties 
and famine to all the major continental powers of Europe. It was with hopes of bringing 
international order in Europe that the major powers signed the Treat of Westphalia. 
Unfortunately, the wars continued between the continental powers in Europe with the 20th 
century noted as the bloodiest in all history.19 The founding of the League of Nations and 
later the United Nations was much in response to the early bloodshed in the 20th Century. 
The purpose of the UN Charter was to prevent conflicts between states that could escalate 
into another world war.  However, the UN Charter failed to incorporate principles on how 
to deal with intra-state conflicts, which today constitute 95 per cent of all conflicts.20 The 
Charter gave the Security Council the mandate to review “any dispute, or any situation 
which might lead to an international friction or give rise to a dispute,” (Article 34) 21 but 
it did not give the Security Council the enforcement powers to settle internal conflicts. As 
noted above, the Charter does not authorize the Security Council to intervene in matters 
that are essential within domestic jurisdiction (Article 2). Nonetheless, the Security 
Council has argued that internal conflicts or humanitarian disasters can destabilize 
international peace. By intervening in the domestic jurisdiction of a state, the UN would 
be violating the sovereign rights of a nation state as defined in international law.  
It has been argued that the gap between customary international law and 
contemporary international relations was to blame for the Security Council’s inadequate 
response to several humanitarian disasters and conflicts in the 1990s. The reaction to 
Security Council’s inadequate response to humanitarian disasters became the main 
drivers for the human security agenda. In the 1990s, “human security” presented a 
humanitarian agenda that valued human rights, international humanitarian law and 
socioeconomic development based on equity. The human security agenda was based on 
the notion that there should be freedom from “pervasive threats to people’s rights, their 
                                                        
19 Benjamin A. Valentino. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2004) 1-2.  
20 Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2007) 83.  
21 Edward C. Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise (New York: Routeledge, 2006) 21. 
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safety or even their lives.”22 The advocates of the human security agenda recognized 
nation-states as primary providers of security, but if a state was inept or unwilling to 
provide protection, other international actors had a responsibility to provide humanitarian 
aid and protection. In essence, human security advocates argued that international peace 
and security are assured only when people have obtained security. According to the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) the human 
security agenda became the most significant threat to the traditional concept of state 
sovereignty and the notion of non-intervention.23 Nonetheless, it was probably the ICISS 
that presented the most profound challenge to international law.  
 The Government of Canada and the UN established the ICISS in a joint effort to 
develop a new framework to reconcile the traditional concepts of state sovereignty with 
the humanitarian agenda. After extensive investigation and debate, the ICISS published 
its renowned report called “The Responsibility to Protect” in 2001.24 The essential idea 
behind the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is that sovereign states have the responsibility 
to protect their own citizens from harm, and when states are unable or unwilling to do so, 
the responsibility rests with the international community of states. If the international 
community is forced to intervene, it is not to wage a war upon the state that has failed or 
has been unwilling; it is to protect the victims that are experiencing atrocities. The report 
argues that the only legitimate justification for intervention would be “conscience-
shocking situations,” such as “large-scale loss of life” or “large-scale ethnic cleansing.”25 
The R2P was endorsed at the UN World Summit in 2005, and by the Security Council in 
2006 as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.”26 
 The R2P provide a genuine challenge to the definition of state sovereignty in the 
UN Charter. However, it is important to note that an international endorsement of the 
principles of the R2P does not change international law. As noted by Simon Chesterman, 
a professor of international law, there is no existing international law that would justify 
                                                        
22 ICISS, 11.  
23 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 2001) 9-11.  
24 ICISS, p. VIII. 
25 Ibid, 32. 
26 Ibid.  
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state intervention for humanitarian purposes.27 It is only through state practice that a new 
international norm can be codified into international law. In effect, the real test to R2P is 
whether states will decide to integrate this new norm into their foreign policies and 
decision-making.28  
 
1.4 China and State Sovereignty  
In Unifying China, Integration with the World, Allen Carlson provides an analysis 
of China’s relationship with the international community (including the United Nations) 
by analyzing what he describes as the “prominent role of sovereignty.”29 Carlson argues 
that  
“Sovereignty, and the extent to which it creates impermeable walls between any 
given state and other actors in the international system, lies at the core of 
contemporary China’s evolving relationship with the rest of the world.”30 
 
This argument by Carlson is well supported by an examination of the official Chinese 
foreign policy documents, referred to as the White Papers. The Chinese White Papers 
were published in the 1990s to better articulate the Chinese stance on several 
controversial foreign affairs issues. To date there have been over 60 published White 
Papers on topics, such as Tibet, human rights and national security.31 These documents 
provide insight to China’s official foreign policies. Central to the White Papers are the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:  mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 
equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.32 The Premier of China, Wen 
Jiabao, recently stated of the Five Principles that “sovereignty is the birthmark of any 
independent state, the crystallization of its national interests and the best safeguard of all 
it holds dear.” Furthermore, the premier argued “the UN should act in accordance with 
the Five Principles and its own Charter, and play its constructive role more vigorously in 
                                                        
27 Welsh.  
28 Nick Grono, “Briefing – Darfur: The International Community’s Failure to Protect” in African Affairs, 
105/421 (2006) 623-24.  
29 Allen Carlson, Unifying China, integrating with the World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) 1.  
30 Ibid, 225. 
31 The Chinese government website is available at www.china.org.cn  
32 Jiang Zhuqing (China Daily), “Five Principles” Still shaping global Peace” June 29, 2004. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/29/content_343578.htm  
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resolving international disputes, preserving peace, and providing humanitarian 
assistance.”33 
China, being one of the permanent members of the Security Council, has the 
power to influence the Security Council’s final decision-making outcomes and 
resolutions. In the beginning, China was a non-participating member of the Security 
Council that rarely tried to influence decision-making processes. In the last decade, China 
has become increasingly engaged in the Security Council discussions and by voting on 
almost every resolution.34 Although China has been provided with the power to veto 
resolutions as a permanent member of the Security Council, it has rarely evoked this 
power. By investigating the resolutions of which China has vetoed, Sally Morphet found 
a pattern. Morphet argues that the pattern “illustrate[s] China’s main concern regarding 
peacekeeping enforcement operations and certain other UN recommendations or 
decisions.”35 Morphet argues that the reason why peacekeeping has been an issue to 
China is the  
“importance of protecting its own territorial integrity and sovereignty against 
Western-dominated international military, political, human rights and 
humanitarian intervention without agreement from the country concerned.”36   
 
Morphet relates this positioning to China’s support of state sovereignty as articulated in 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.37 In essence, China argues that there are no 
circumstances that would trump the authority of a sovereign state, including the abuse of 
human rights.38 Though China vigorously insists that nothing can trump state 
sovereignty, Ron Wheeler discovered that China has not prevented Chapter VII being 
used repeatedly for resolutions covering human rights cases in the 1990s.  
“Verbally supporting national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states, China does little with its formidable voting power to block 
actions which are inconsistent with those principles.”39 
                                                        
33 Ibid.  
34 Sally Morphet, “China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council: October 1971-December 1999,” 
Security Dialogue (Vol. 31, No. 2, 2002) 154 and 160.   
35 Ibid, 165. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Carlson, 174-175.  
39 Ron Wheeler, “China, the UN and National Sovereignty: Drawing a Line on Supranationalism?” Swords 
and Plowshares: the United Nations in Transition, eds. Ron Wheeler and Howard McConnell (Toronto: 
Canadian Scholars Press Inc., 1997) 45.  
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Why China has been indolent to defend its own ideological beliefs are explained by 
Wheeler to be justified by the complexities of the international political environment and 
the relationships within the UN. Wheeler makes an important statement as it reflects on 
the actual Chinese application of state sovereignty. Although Chinese foreign policies 
reflect a rigid and traditional definition of state sovereignty, the state practice has 
reflected a willingness to be flexible with the application. 
 
1.5 The United States and State Sovereignty  
The United States “recognize[s] that international law has a critical role in world 
affairs, and is vital to the resolution of conflicts and the coordination of cooperation.”40 
These are the words of John B. Bellinger III, a legal advisor to the former Bush 
administration. Bellinger also argues that the US is practicing a strong commitment to 
international law. This argument is different to most arguments made by academics and 
other foreign policy officers who argue that the United States’ lack of commitment to 
international treaties illustrates unwillingness to embrace international law. Michael 
Chertoff, the former United States Secretary of Homeland Security, argues that the 
United States has been cautious in embracing international treaties that undermine the 
traditional concept of sovereignty. The traditional concept of state sovereignty is 
explained as the Westphalian model in which an “independent state is not subject to 
external control over its internal affairs without its consent.”41 Furthermore, Cheroff 
argues,  
 “Democracy is based on the principles that the people are sovereign and that only 
with their consent may a government rule with legitimacy. Democratic national 
sovereignty therefore reflects the ideal that citizens should be governed only by 
laws to which they have assented.”42   
 
                                                        
40 John B. Bellinger III, State’s Legal Expert Reiterates U.S. Devotion to International Law, The US State 
Department, June 7, 2007. 
41 Michael Chertoff, “The Responsibility to Contain: Protecting Sovereignty Under International Law,” 
Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January/February 2009) 132.  
42 Ibid, 132.  
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In other words, Cheroff argues that imposing international law without the consent of its 
people would undermine the traditional concept of state sovereignty. A democracy is to 
choose its own laws, and not to have laws enforced on them by outsiders. 
 David M. Malone argues that how the United States has approached state 
sovereignty has defined its relationship to other states and international organizations. 
The protection of national sovereignty has always taken precedence over foreign and 
internationally promoted norms, standards and laws.43 The protectionist approach to state 
sovereignty has resulted in a cautious approach to dealing with state sovereignty issues in 
international relations. Malone argues, a 
“case-by case approach to the Security Council’s incursions into the sovereignty 
of UN member states, generally avoiding assertions of an abstract right or duty to 
intervene in situations of grave humanitarian crises. Where convenient in terms of 
US interest, or strongly compelling in terms of international humanitarian law, the 
administration was prepared to champion, or at least support, the violation of state 
sovereignty.”   
 
Although it will be difficult to find a pattern in how the United States has interpreted 
international law and state sovereignty, a closer investigation of American behavior in the 
Security Council will shed light on its official positioning 
Government publications are important in understanding the American view. Two 
significant documents are the National Security Strategy publications of 2002 and 2006. 
In the National Security Strategy (NSS) document published in 2002, the Bush 
administration focused on maintaining national security in a post-September 11 era. 
Though the document does not refer directly to international law and state sovereignty, 
the NSS 2002 makes statements that provide clear insight to the official policy towards 
the sovereignty of other states. The NSS 2002 claims that one of the “deadliest” 
challenges to international peace is rogue states.44 Rogue states are nation-states that are 
brutalizing their own populations, squandering natural resources, and ignoring 
international law while creating environments fostering terrorism and threats to 
international peace security. The NSS 2002 goes on to pronounce that the United States 
                                                        
43 David M. Malone, “A Decade of U.S. Unilateralism?” Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: 
International Perspectives, eds. David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publisher, 2003) 19.  
44 National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 
DC: GPO, September 2002) 13.  
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was willing to consider a preemptive and unilateral approach to fight the emerging threats 
from rogue states.45 In essence, the US argued that it would be independently willing to 
undermine the sovereignty of another state if faced with threats to its own national 
security or international peace. The United States had already put these policies into 
action in 2001 when it breached the sovereign powers of Afghanistan with a military 
intervention.  
Four years later the National Security Strategy 2006 distinctively mentioned the 
Government of Sudan as an accomplice to the genocide in Darfur and a disruptor of 
regional security.46 The document asserted that genocide must “not be tolerated.”47 If 
perpetrators do not cooperate in finding peaceful solutions, “an armed intervention may 
be required, preferably by the forces of several nations working together under 
appropriate regional or international auspices.”48 Again, the United States argued that 
there are conditions that can override the sovereign rights of a state, such as human rights 
abuses and genocides. Nonetheless, there was a shift on how to undermine sovereignty. 
The national security strategy has shifted from a potential unilateral approach to a more 
fluid application of state sovereignty that has taken into consideration the changing 
international environment. Nonetheless, it is a position on state sovereignty that is 
influenced by national interests.   
 
1.6 Conclusion  
The complexities of state sovereignty in international relations have not been fully 
comprehended.  Some academics still view state sovereignty as a strong unchanging 
pillar that much of international relations rest upon, although others argue that state 
sovereignty is less rigid. Other academics argue that there are many challenges brought 
forth by globalization, the human rights movement and domestic conflicts that influence 
state sovereignty at some level of decision-making.49 Nonetheless, there has been 
minimal research to support the arguments of the changing role of state sovereignty in 
                                                        
45 Ibid, 14-16. 
46 National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 
DC: GPO, March 2006) 15. 
47 Ibid, 17.  
48 Ibid. 
49 ICISS, 4-6. 
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contemporary international relations. This thesis will shed light on how two of the most 
influential powers, China and the United States, have exercised their definitions of state 
sovereignty through political actions to shape an emerging international response to the 
tradeoff between state sovereignty and human security. 
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2. THE DARFURIAN NIGHTMARE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Darfur has a history of always being on the geographic and political periphery.  
While the vast geographic area with its extreme weather pattern kept the area isolated 
from unwanted guests and rulers, the political exclusion kept the region from gaining 
access to education, economic development, and protection. The government of Sudan’s 
continuous disregard for Darfur fuelled a rebellious movement. The rebels were asking 
for basic rights such as safety from violence, starvation and political ignorance. Instead of 
providing the basic rights to the people of the Darfur, the government decided to clamp 
down on the rebellion. This was the start of the infamous Darfur conflict. The Security 
Council along with the international community has been slow to respond, and has been 
incapable of finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In the centre of the resolution 
debates in the Security Council is the notion of state sovereignty, as the government of 
Sudan has continuously repeated its rights against outside intervention. Hence, the Darfur 
conflict can provide a better understanding of the role of state sovereignty in 
contemporary international relations, and provides an excellent case study.  
The purpose of chapter 1 is to introduce a case study of the Darfur conflict and to 
provide an understanding of the main actors and their positioning during the conflict. 
This background information is essential in comprehending the positioning and 
arguments made by China and the United States when discussing state sovereignty in the 
Security Council.  
 
2.2 Background: Darfur on the Periphery  
The territory of Darfur is remotely situated in the heart of Africa, completely 
landlocked from the sea, and being approximately 150,000 square miles, is almost the 
size of France.50 The isolation of the region and its geographic vastness liberated it from 
early colonialism as Darfur was one of the last territories in Africa to be colonized by the 
                                                        
50 Gerard Prunier. Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (New York: Cornel University Press, 2005) 2. 
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British into their Egyptian Sudan Empire 1916.51 The British colonial powers handled 
Africans and Arabs differently as it was assumed by the colonial powers that Arabs were 
morally and intellectually superior to the Africans.52 When the British began their quest 
to establish a Sudanese elite, education was provided to the Arabic North, while Darfur 
was ignored.53 The conditions did not improve after Sudan received its independence in 
1956. The country continued to be highly centralized, and Darfur continued to be on the 
periphery. The Darfur region became highly politicized as Darfurians were desperate for 
influence in Khartoum. At the same time, Khartoum introduced administrative changes 
that diminished the traditional leadership and divided tribal groups in Darfur. 54 In effect, 
a separated Darfur was incapable of presenting a unified front in Khartoum. 
In the 1980s, the desertification and drought that had started in the mid 1970s 
worsened. The scarcity over water and resources intensified as Arabic nomadic tribes 
were entering Southern Darfur from Chad, Libya and other regions in the search for 
water. There was no effective government for the Darfurians to rely upon for safety, 
security or relief help. Hence, in response to the influx of Arabic nomadic tribes, the 
settled tribes (mainly the Fur) started village defence groups and militias.55 By 1984, the 
famine became difficult to ignore as internally displaced peoples (IDP) camps were 
emerging outside Khartoum. The famine was also destabilizing the region as conflicts 
were breaking out in neighbouring provinces and countries.56 The Khartoum government 
would not accept responsibility for the famine, and let international aid and donors deal 
with the situation.57 The famine illustrated, yet again, how successive governments in 
Khartoum since the British conquest, have never cared about the peoples of Darfur. 
 
 
 
                                                        
51 M. W. Daly. Darfur’s Sorrow:  A History of Destruction and Genocide (New York: Cambridge 
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52 O’Fahey, 32.  
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54 Prunier, 42-48.  
55 Human Rights Council, 11.  
56 Prunier, 50-51. 
57 Martin Meredith. The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2005) 361. 
 18 
 
2.3 The Darfurian Nightmare 
One of the most fatal consequences of the Sudanese government’s inaction was 
the flood of arms into the region for self-protection against looters during the Darfur 
famine in the 1980s. The lack of an effective government, and the increasing number and 
prevalence of small arms, added to the instability in the region and resulted in violent 
outbursts regularly throughout the ‘80s and ‘90s.58 However, it wasn’t until 1999 that the 
current Darfur conflict began when all the Darfurian members of the Congress Party were 
removed from their seats.59 In 2000, an anonymous “Black Book” was circulated within 
the government,  wider Sudan and internationally. The book went into detail about the 
neglect people in Darfur suffered at the hands of their own government since its 
independence in 1956, whereby authorities in Khartoum adopted policies to keep Darfur 
underdeveloped. The revelations in the book were supported by government documents 
that could only have been leaked by government officials. The Black Book united several 
resistance groups in Darfur, but unfortunately also managed to strengthen the divide 
between the Arabs and the Africans within Darfur.60 The Khartoum government reacted 
by recruiting militias from ethnic groups from the Baggara (Arabic Settlers in the South) 
and the Abbala (Arabic nomads). The Baggara and Abbala, which collectively became 
known as the Janjaweed, were recruited into the Sudanese military, the Popular Defense 
Front (PDF) and would be used in government-backed counterinsurgency operations.61 
The government also recruited thousands of Arabs from neighbouring Chad to be trained 
alongside the Janjaweed.62 
At the same time, the rebels within Darfur divided into two separate rebel groups. 
The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) adopted the ideology of the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) from southern Sudan, which called for a “united, 
secular state in which all are equal and which, by implication, Sudan’s non-Arab 
demographic majority would rule.”63 The SLM/A under the leadership of the young 
lawyer, Abdel Wahid Nur had members from the Fur and Masalit tribes. The second 
                                                        
58 Alex de Waal. “Briefing: Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for Peace.” in African Affairs (104, no. 414 (2005): 
127-13)127. 
59 Waal, 128.  
60 Daly, 275-277 
61 Human Rights Council, 12.  
62 Daly, 277 
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group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), adopted the Black Book as their 
manifesto to develop an agenda for their group. They called for “radical constitutional 
reform, regional empowerment, and social democracy, but not secularism.”64 JEM’s 
founding chairman was Khalil Ibrahim, a medical doctor, from the Zagahawa tribe. JEM 
was noted to look much like a regional political party, with a political agenda, and 
members that were previous Darfurian politicians pushed out of the Khartoum 
government.65   
The SLM/A launched their first surprise attack in February 2003 against a 
garrison in Golu, followed with JEM joint attacks towards government airports and 
buildings in El Fashir, Nyala, and Mellit. At first, SLM/A and JEM experienced success 
in the initial attacks on government infrastructure and installations capturing arms and 
food.66 The rebels had captured the strategic advantage in mobility by using guerilla-like 
tactics. Khartoum decided that they would respond with surprise attacks as well, but not 
against the rebels, but against the civilian population. While the Janjaweed surrounded 
the villages, the government planes would bomb villages using aerial attacks. When the 
bombing ended, the Janjaweed would move into the villages to loot, rape, torch and kill 
what was left.67 The attacks were extremely brutal and vicious.   
The ramifications of the war became quickly immeasurable. In January 2004, Jan 
Egeland, the UN under secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief 
coordinator described the situation in Darfur as one of the worst humanitarian disasters in 
the world.68 By March 2004, the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO) was 
estimating about 10,000 deaths a month by collecting data from the refugees.69 Using 
these estimates, the UN estimated approximately 200,000 deaths in March 2006.70 Since 
March 2004, there has been no mortality survey completed. The Government of Sudan is 
not interested in such a survey, and the United Nations is “too busy trying to help the 
                                                        
64 Daly, 278 
65 Daly, 277.  
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living.”71 A simple calculation using the WHO estimates from March 2006 brings the 
death toll to more than half a million people by June 2009. In addition to the death toll, 
the report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United 
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur estimated 2.7 million people to be displaced as a 
result of the Darfur conflict.72 Furthermore, over half of the original population of Darfur, 
estimated at 6 million, has been seriously affected by the conflict.  
There have been many attempts to find a peaceful resolution to the Darfur 
conflict. The first agreement was made in September 2003 when the government of 
Sudan and SLM/A signed a ceasefire agreement. This agreement was at first successful in 
stopping fighting between the SLM/A and the government, but rather intensified the 
attacks by the Janjaweed on the civilian population. In April 2004, the Government, 
SLM/A and JEM signed a humanitarian ceasefire agreement and protocols to establish 
humanitarian assistance in Darfur. This agreement also called for the establishment of a 
ceasefire commission to monitor the situation under the auspices of the African Union 
(AU).73 The ceasefire discussions of April 2004 were the start of several rounds of peace 
talks in Addis Ababa and Abuja. The peace talks got bogged down because the 
government in Khartoum was unwilling to compromise, and because SLM/A and JEM’s 
continuously focused on short-term demands for humanitarian relief and protection from 
the Janjaweed.74  The peace talks did result in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA) on May 5, 2006, but its success was already doomed as JEM and factions of the 
SLM/A decided not to sign the agreement. Unfortunately, the DPA resulted in 
intensifying the conflict in Darfur.75 The SLM/A splintered and fighting has since erupted 
between signatories and those opposed to the DPA. Also, the government of Sudan has 
thwarted attempts by the factions to meet and develop a united front for possible new 
peace talks. The UN Human Rights Council Report also reported that violations of 
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human rights and international law had “increased by all parties to the conflict since the 
signing of the DPA.”76  
Another round of negotiations started in 2008 after an attempted coup by JEM 
against the government in Khartoum.  This time, it was only JEM and the government of 
Sudan that were included in the negotiations. JEM argued that their group was more 
important than the other rebel groups, to which the Government of Sudan agreed in order 
to fragment the rebels. The two parties signed a peace accord on February 17, 2009. 
Though the accord raised hope for a future peace agreement, the fighting intensified, not 
only between JEM and the Government of Sudan, but also between the rebel groups. The 
Secretary General stated in his update on Darfur to the Security Council on February 
2009 that, “the escalation in the level of violence in Darfur signals an investment in 
conflict rather than a serious commitment to peaceful negotiations.”77 In light of these 
observations, peace in the near future seems unattainable.  
 
2.4 The International Response to the Darfur Conflict  
The first international response to the Darfur Conflict came from the Government 
of Chad in late 2003. The Chadian government took leadership in chairing negotiations as 
its own security and peace were been challenged by the conflict because of the large 
movement of people. Though the Chadian government has been challenged on its 
abilities as a neutral negotiator,78 it became clear that Chad acted because no one else 
recognized the extent to which the conflict destabilized the region. By early 2004, the AU 
took over the leadership role in the negotiations. This resulted in the establishment of the 
AU Ceasefire Commission in April 2004 that deployed a small team of 60 monitors and 
300 troops. Over the next two years, the AU took an official peacekeeping role and 
increased troops to 7,000. The expectations of the role of the AU in Darfur were high as 
it was the AU’s first peacekeeping mission in a major African conflict. Unfortunately, the 
AU mission quickly became hindered by the inexperience of the troops and lack of 
resources to pay for troops and equipment. In result, the AU peacekeeping force became 
                                                        
76 Human Rights Council, 13.  
77 United Nations Security Council, “the Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African 
Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur” February 10, 2009 
78 Williams, Paul D. and Alex J. Bellamy. “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur.” 
Security Dialogue (36, no. 1, March 2005), 30.  
 22 
 
stretched too thin, and was unable to provide as much assistance as was needed for the 
people of Darfur.79 As the mandate of the AU peacekeeping force was coming to its end 
in September 2006, the AU announced that it was not willing to continue its mission and 
called upon the UN to take the leadership in Darfur.80   
The UN had taken a backseat role in the first years of the Darfur conflict, with the 
first mention of the conflict by Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, in April 2004, 
when he contrasted the Darfur conflict with the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. Annan said 
that the atrocities in Darfur “leave me with a deep sense of foreboding. Whatever term it 
uses to describe the situation, the international community cannot stand idle… [It] must 
be prepared to take swift and appropriate action. By “action” in such situations I mean a 
continuum of steps, which may include military action.”81 In response to this speech, the 
UN Human Rights Commission decided to make an inquiry into the atrocities in Darfur. 
The Acting High Commissioner of Human Rights, Bertrand Ramcharan, presented the 
report to the UN Security Council May 7 in a closed meeting. His report found “a 
disturbing pattern of disregard for basic principles of human rights” and could document 
breaches of humanitarian law by both the armed forces of Sudan and Janjaweed.82 It 
provided evidence that the Government of Sudan was in fact arming, training and paying 
the Janjaweed. The report recognized that the Darfur rebel groups were also violating 
international human rights laws, but stated that the fault lie mainly with the Khartoum 
government because it had failed to address the marginalization and underdevelopment of 
the region.83 The High Commissioner recommended that a more comprehensive 
investigation should be performed into the human rights violations in Darfur and that 
justice should be brought on the perpetrators.84  
The Darfur Conflict attracted more public attention because of increasingly 
disturbing findings by the Commission on Human Rights. Nonetheless, the Darfur 
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conflict did not appear on the Security Council agenda until June 2004. The first UN 
Security Council meeting on Darfur was to decide whether the UN should send a 
delegation to oversee the peace negotiations between the Government of Sudan and 
SPLM/A. Although the resolution did not directly speak to the Darfur conflict, it 
reaffirmed its “commitment to the sovereignty, independence and unity of Sudan.” 
During these early discussions, it became clear that any substantial agreement regarding 
Darfur would be difficult to achieve. China and Russia believed that the conflict was 
insufficient to breach Sudan’s sovereignty, while the United Kingdom and France were 
unwilling to prove them wrong.  The United States did voice some concerns regarding 
the human rights abuses, but only confirmed its support for an AU solution.85 Already at 
the first discussion of Darfur, there was a pattern developing in which China was 
unwilling to breach the state sovereignty of Sudan, and the United States reacted with 
horror to the human rights abuses while being unwilling to support Security Council 
action.  
This same pattern of positioning among the permanent members within the 
Security Council continued throughout the 95 meetings in which the Darfur conflict was 
on the agenda from 2004 till the end of 2009. The majority of the meetings were followed 
by no action, while 25 of the meetings resulted in resolutions. The resolutions can be 
divided into three main actions that the Security Council responded with in the case of 
Darfur: sanctions against the perpetrators, referrals of the atrocities to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), and the deployment of a United Nations and African Union hybrid 
peacekeeping force. When implemented the resolutions would all have negative 
implications for the sovereignty of Sudan. The government of Sudan has been present for 
many of the discussions in the Security Council, and has been outraged by the 
willingness to breach its sovereignty and violate the non-interference principle.  
                    
2.5 Relations with the Government of Sudan  
The Security Council agenda is often a reflection of the global geopolitical and 
regional realities.86 Permanent members can purposely block issues to prevent them from 
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reaching the agenda or can veto purposed resolutions. The United States has continuously 
since the creation of Israel in 1948, vetoed resolutions that proposed to penalize Israel for 
its actions against Palestine, while China vetoed a resolution in 2008 that would condemn 
the government of Zimbabwe for using violence in its recent election.87 The inter-
governmental relations between the United States and Israel or between China and 
Zimbabwe clearly affected the outcome of the Security Council resolutions. Similarly, in 
the case of Darfur, it is also important to understand intergovernmental relationships, 
particularly between Sudan and China and between Sudan and the United States.  
The relationship between the United States and Sudan has been strained since the 
Arab-Israeli war in 1967 to which Sudan responded by breaking off diplomatic relations 
with the United States. In 1973, the United States broke off relations after Sudan released 
Egyptian terrorist members of Black September, responsible for the murders of the 
Americans Ambassador Cleo A. Noel and Deputy Chief of Mission Curtis G. Moore in 
Khartoum.88 In the 1908s, it seemed like the relationship had improved as the United 
States funneled investments into Sudan to support the current ruling government. This 
investment was however to prevent the pro-soviet opposition to take power in Sudan, 
rather than an act of support for the actual government in power.89 The United States also 
became the largest provider of foreign aid during this time as they were trying to prevent 
the destabilization of the country which would assist pro-Soviet groups from taking 
power.90 Unfortunately, its efforts and resources to prevent a pro-Soviet government 
failed and in 1989 the Islamic militants, led by Omar al-Bashir, achieved a successful 
coup. Immediately after, the new government voiced its interest in becoming the centre 
for pan-Islamic military activities, welcoming militant Islamists from other Middle 
Eastern countries and providing diplomatic passports to Islamist activists from Algeria, 
Tunisia and Egypt.  
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By 1991, Sudan had become an international haven for Muslim terrorists such as 
Osama bin Laden.91 Camps were set up to provide military training and government-
sponsored conferences were hosted to discuss the Islamic “war on America.”92 The 
United States reacted by declaring Sudan “a state sponsor of terrorism,”93 and followed 
this with economic sanctions and a freezing of diplomatic relations. One of the tensest 
moments in American-Sudanese relations was in 1998, when the United States bombed a 
pharmaceutical factory outside Khartoum in retaliation for the bombings of the embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania by terrorists trained in Sudan. The United States believed that the 
factory was used by Osama bin Laden to develop chemical weapons, although this was 
later determined to be false.94  
When terrorist groups attacked the United States on September 11th, the 
Government of Sudan was quick to denounce all terrorist attacks and claim its support for 
the American war against terrorism. The Bush administration exploited this new 
willingness to collaborate to push for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the 
government of Sudan and rebels in the South. The United States ended up playing an 
influential negotiating role together with Britain and Norway in ending the conflict in 
2002.95 The United States had a vested interest in stabilizing the region, not only to 
prevent terrorist activities, but also to ensure that the region would open up for foreign 
investment in the oil industry. American petroleum companies had repeatedly voiced 
their interest in the region and the possibilities of Sudanese oil enhancing the American 
economy.96  
As the conflict in southern Sudan was coming to an end, another conflict was 
intensifying in the western region of Sudan: Darfur. At first, the United States was 
criticized for not being willing to jeopardize its hard-fought peace in the South by 
properly responding to the Darfur conflict. But in September 2004, the United States 
became the first country to accuse the Government of Sudan of genocide in Darfur.97 
President George W. Bush then applied what some refer to as the “stick” approach which 
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excluded providing any carrots to encourage good behavior.98 The Bush administration 
consistently worked on providing justice to the region, including supporting the 
unprecedented move of having the ICC undertake an investigation into the atrocities in 
Darfur. This approach to the Darfur conflict led to further deterioration in the inter-
governmental relationship between the United States and Sudan.  
The relationship between Sudan and the United States has improved somewhat 
with the change of government in the United States. In November 2008, Barak Obama 
was elected as the President of the United States and in January 2009 President George 
W. Bush ended his term.  President Obama had made the Darfur conflict an election 
issue, and had been quite outspoken on the topic. Obama had completed interviews with 
organizations such as Save Darfur in which he spoke about the moral obligation of the 
United States to stop the genocide in Darfur.99 However, the Obama administration 
decided to apply a more diplomatic approach to the Darfur conflict which included the 
“carrot and stick” approach instead of only the stick as under the leadership of President 
George W. Bush.100 In April of 2009, Darfur activists and media began arguing that 
President Obama had adopted a policy of appeasement towards Sudan. In fact, the Sudan 
Tribune announced that the relationship between Sudan and the United States had started 
to normalize.101 Nonetheless, President Obama continued to refer of the conflict as a 
genocide and spoke of bringing justice to the region.102  
While the United States and other western countries froze their diplomatic 
relations with Sudan in the 1990s, China started to develop a friendlier relationship with 
the government of Sudan. The new approach reflected a renewed interest in Africa, 
which was also evidenced by increases in Chinese investments. From 1991 to 1999 
Chinese investments in Africa grew from $25 million to $100 million USD. By 2006, 
Chinese investment had grown to $1.25 billion USD and the trade relationship between 
China and Africa was estimated at $55 billion USD (latest numbers available).103 The 
focus of Chinese activities and interest in Africa has mainly been in petroleum and 
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natural resources; an interest driven by China’s resource scarcity and a growing need for 
oil.104  
The relationship China has established with Sudan over the last two decades is a 
reflection of China’s interest in petroleum. While the United States and other western 
countries imposed economic sanctions and cancelled foreign investments in Sudan, China 
increased investments in Sudan, ignoring Sudan’s support for militant Islamists. In 1996, 
China bought 40 percent of the Great Nile Petroleum Operating Company in Sudan, and 
started to assist Khartoum to develop exploration activities and the oil industry. At that 
time, it was the largest Chinese foreign investment.105 Sudan, lacking of capital to extract 
its oil riches, welcomed the Chinese investments. China also invested in other large oil 
projects and companies in Sudan, including Sinopec that is building hundreds of miles of 
pipeline from Port Sudan to the Red Sea where China is also building a tanker 
terminal.106 In 2008, it was estimated that Sudan exported almost 60 percent of its oil to 
China.107 Sudan is dependent on its oil export as it accounts for 95 percent of its 
revenues.108 In other words, it is a trade relationship from which both parties greatly 
benefit.  
The oil revenues have been invested by the government of Sudan into updating 
and strengthening its military. In 2007, it was estimated that Sudan spent as much as 70 
percent of its oil revenue to purchase and manufacture arms,109 for which the main arms 
supplier was China. This finding was controversial, as the UN Security Council had 
imposed an arms embargo on Sudan for its role in the conflict as early as 2004. However, 
China has repeatedly denied that its arms agreements with Sudan have violated the arms 
embargo. In July 2008, the BBC documentary Panorama discredited this claim when 
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they released video evidence that Chinese military vehicles and weapons were used by 
Sudanese troops in Darfur.110  
It has been argued that China’s close trading relationship with Sudan has given 
China some leverage to negotiate with Sudan regarding the conflict in Darfur. 111 
According to Chinese officials, this is not a leverage that they would like to utilize. This 
position was well articulated by the Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou Wenzhong, when he 
proclaimed, “business is business. We try to separate politics from business. I think the 
internal situation in Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose 
upon them.”112 This was also the approach maintained when the international community 
increased pressure on the Chinese government while it was preparing to host the Summer 
Olympics in Beijing in August 2008. Politicians, participants and viewers threatened to 
boycott the Olympics unless China used its close relationship with Sudan to bring a 
peaceful solution to the Darfur conflict.113 Some advocates for the boycott, such as Mia 
Farrow and Nicholas Kristof, dubbed it the “Genocide Olympics.”114 They argued that 
China was using proceeds from its arms sales to Sudan to pay for the Olympics, and 
therefore individuals supporting the Olympics were also supporting the ongoing genocide 
in Darfur.115 Though the campaign to tarnish the Olympics in Beijing was somewhat 
successful, China did not sway under the pressure and continued its policy to not interfere 
within the domestic affairs of Sudan. The Chinese approach was well summed up by the 
President of China, Hu Jintao, who staged that “any solution in Darfur needs to respect 
the sovereignty of Sudan and be based on dialogue.”116   
   
2.6 Conclusion 
The Darfur conflict represents a situation where the population is suffering at the 
hands of its own impenitent government. The Darfurian people need international aid and 
security, while the government of Sudan demands non-interference in its domestic 
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affairs. While discussing how to respond to the conflict, the Security Council has had to 
consistently balance state sovereignty with crimes against humanity. In particular, the 
Security Council has had to consider maintaining the powers of a foreign government 
when those powers were used to harm the populace. How can security be brought to the 
people of Darfur while still respecting the sovereign rights of the government of Sudan? 
Subsequent chapters explore how China and the United States have responded to this 
particular dilemma evolving in Darfur. A review of the responses will provide an insight 
into the contemporary discussion on the application of state sovereignty.  
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3. THE FIRST DARFURIAN CHALLENGE TO STATE SOVEREINGTY:  
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
When diplomatic efforts fail to end a threat to international peace and security, the 
Security Council can invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which specifies two 
different types of measures. One is the “complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” (Article 41). This type of 
measure - a mandatory sanction - “is intended to apply pressure on a State or entity to 
comply with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of 
force.”117 The use of force is the second type of measure that the Security Council can 
impose by evoking Chapter VII (Article 42). Article 41 and 42 provide the UN with two 
possible loopholes that can legally breach the right of non-intervention of sovereign states 
when they are found to be a threat to international peace and security. 
Only twice during the Cold War did the Security Council evoked Chapter VII to 
implement sanctions.118 In 1965 the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution 
to impose economic sanctions against the white minority government in Southern 
Rhodesia (today known as Zimbabwe) and in 1977, it unanimously imposed an arms 
embargo against the apartheid government in South Africa.119 The unanimous support 
within the Security Council reflected a strong political willingness to not only apply 
sanctions but to make them effective. It is important to note that there were also other 
sanctions imposed during this era, including arms embargos against the parties involved 
in the Palestine conflict and against the Portuguese Government, and economic sanctions 
imposed on South Africa. These were not implemented with the use of Chapter VII and 
consequently, they were non-binding to the member states of the UN.120  
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The use of sanctions by the Security Council increased rapidly after the end of the 
Cold War. In fact, the 1990s stood out so much that it has been referred to as “the 
sanctions decade.”121 Sanctions were implemented to deal with a wide array of threats to 
international peace and security, including aggressive state behaviour (Iraq); the 
overthrow of a democratic elected government (Haiti); human rights violations 
(Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia); civil wars (Angola, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea); and terrorist activities (Libya).122 The sanctions implemented against Iraq will 
undoubtedly stand out as one of the most controversial actions of that decade. Sanctions 
implemented unintentionally created a humanitarian disaster, which Saddam Hussein 
used to gain international sympathy, thus beginning a new dialogue on how to implement 
more effective sanctions.123   
By the end of the decade, new rules and procedures for implementation and 
monitoring had been established. The new approach was to review every individual 
sanction on a case-by-case basis and to develop the best measures for each case. The new 
approach resulted in more targeted sanctions such as freezing assets and travel bans for 
individuals that were found to be a threat to international peace and security.124 While 
fine-tuning of the rules and procedures strengthened the sanctions regime, it also 
highlighted the need for political willingness of the UN member states, and particularly 
Security Council members, to adhere to decisions. This was better articulated by Edward 
C. Luck who argues that the most critical factor for sanctions to be successful is “the 
willingness and capacity of member states to implement the Council’s decision...  
Political will is not an independent variable, as it will be affected by perceptions of the 
stakes involved, the likelihood of success, and the motivations of others.”125 In other 
words, sanctions can be designed to follow all the rules, but will only be successful if 
there is a willingness among all UN member states to comply. The Security Council can 
only request member states to comply with its decisions, but has no authority to enforce 
or police the activities of member states.  
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In the case of Darfur, the Security Council was slow to implement sanctions or 
react to violations of the sanctions as the members were divided in what constituted an 
appropriate response to the conflict. Nonetheless, the Security Council approved 10 
resolutions between 2004 and 2009 that imposed sanctions on the parties involved in the 
conflict. The main four resolutions that this chapter will focus on are Resolutions 1556, 
1564, 1591 and 1672. The remaining six resolutions (1651, 1665, 1713, 1779, 1841 and 
1891) renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts to oversee the implementation of the 
relevant sanctions that were first established with the approval of Resolution 1591. While 
reviewing the resolutions in detail, this chapter will mainly focus on the statements 
provided by China and the US after the votes in the Security Council. These statements 
provide insight into why China and the US supported or opposed the use of sanctions and 
infringements on the sovereignty of Sudan.  
 
3.2 Resolution 1556  
In May 2004, the Security Council released a statement through the Security 
Council President expressing its grave concern with the deteriorating situation in Darfur 
and called upon the parties to end the conflict. On July 3, after a visit by the Secretary 
General Kofi Annan to Darfur, the Government of Sudan and the United Nations released 
a Joint Communiqué. The Communiqué committed the UN to assist with humanitarian 
aid, mediation and the deployment of AU ceasefire monitors. The Government of Sudan 
committed to: provide access for humanitarian aid in Darfur; take measures to end human 
rights violations and ensure justice was brought to the violators; provide security to the 
people of Darfur and disarm the Janjaweed; and to resume peace settlement 
negotiations.126 In the weeks that followed, the Security Council received reports about 
the worsening situation in Darfur and a new discussion began within the Security Council 
regarding what to do next. One of the actions discussed by the Security Council was to 
impose sanctions on the parties in the conflict, including the Government of Sudan. The 
draft resolution that was up for discussion would impose an arms embargo on the region, 
give the Government of Sudan 30 days to disarm the Janjaweed, and would impose harsh 
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sanctions if these requirements were not met. During the discussions, China strongly 
refused to discuss a possible breach of Sudan’s sovereignty by imposing sanctions, while 
the United States argued that the Darfurians need to be protected and that the 
responsibility was with Government of Sudan. 127 To give the Government of Sudan the 
responsibility for the protection of the people of Darfur was an oxymoron as the UN 
Commission on Human Rights had already found the government to be one of the 
perpetrators.  
In the end the language in the draft resolution was softened, and Resolution 1556 
was adopted by the Security Council July 30, 2004. Resolution 1556 determined that the 
Darfur conflict was a threat to international peace and security and to the stability in the 
region, and gave the Security Council the authority to impose Chapter VII. By imposing 
Chapter VII in Resolution 1556, the Security Council;   
“demands the Government of Sudan fulfill its commitments to disarm the 
Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their 
associates who have incited and carried out human rights and international 
humanitarian law violations and other atrocities, and further requests the 
Secretary-General to report back in 30 days, monthly thereafter, to the Council on 
the progress or lack thereof by the Government of Sudan on this matter and 
express its intention to consider further actions, including measures provided for 
in Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations on the Government of 
Sudan...”128  
 
The Resolution also asked all states to prevent sale or supply of arms and military 
equipment to the parties in the conflict. The softness of the language in the Resolution is 
evident. The resolution does not directly mention imposing explicit sanctions, but rather 
included less offensive language regarding “measures provided in Article 41.” 129 In 
effect, there was no obvious serious threat for the Government of Sudan to not apply the 
requirements in Resolution 1556.  
While the resolution was approved with 13 votes in favor, China along with 
Pakistan, abstained from the vote to show disapproval with the invoking of Article 41.  
After the vote, Zhang Yishan of China spoke directly to China’s decision to abstain: 
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“The draft resolution proposed by the United States and other countries, although 
some amendments have been made to it, still includes mandatory measures 
against the Sudanese Government. As all the parties are speeding up diplomatic 
efforts, such measures cannot be helpful in resolving the situation in Darfur and 
may even further complicate it. China had hoped that the sponsors of the draft 
resolution would have taken seriously into consideration China’s concerns and 
made the appropriate adjustments so as to arrive at a consensus in the Security 
Council. Regrettably, that proposal was not accommodated or responded to. We 
can therefore only abstain in the voting on this draft resolution in the Security 
Council.”130 
 
Mr. Zhang Yishan spoke directly about China’s concerns with imposing measures in the 
conflict. According to Mr. Zhang, China felt that the measures would hinder, rather than 
assist finding a resolution to the severe humanitarian situation.  Zhang argued that Sudan 
had been making improvements to the situation in Darfur, and the international 
community should not halt these efforts. Furthermore, China believed that the 
Government of the Sudan has the “primary responsibility for resolving the Darfur 
situation and that the international community should make every effort to assist the 
Government of the Sudan.” To be able to reach a comprehensive agreement with the 
Government of Sudan, the agreement needed to be based on “respect for the Sudan’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”131 
Ambassador Danforth, speaking on behalf of the United States, was irritated that 
the Security Council was too concerned with language rather than trying to act swiftly 
and decisively. A week before the approval of Resolution 1556, the American Congress 
passed a resolution referring to the Darfur atrocities as a genocide. In speaking in 
reference to these atrocities, Ambassador Danforth was clear that the “responsibility for 
this disaster lies squarely with the Government of Sudan.”132 In countering arguments 
presented by China, Ambassador Danforth argued that the Government of Sudan had not 
lived up to commitments made on July 3, 2004 to ensure humanitarian assistance, 
protection of human rights, and political settlement in Darfur. In result, Ambassador 
Danforth argued: 
“It is time to start the clock ticking on the Government of Sudan... The resolution, 
in stern and unambiguous terms, puts the Government of Sudan on notice that it 
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must fulfill the commitments it made on 3 July. Sudan must know that serious 
measures – international sanctions – are looming if the government refuses to do 
so.”133   
 
American support for Resolution 1556 was strongly voiced by Ambassador Danforth. 
The United States justified breaching the sovereignty of the Government of Sudan if it 
did not comply with the resolution requirements. However, Ambassador Danforth still 
wanted to make it clear that “the purpose of this resolution is to relieve the suffering of 
Darfur, not to punish Sudan.”134  
 
3.3 Resolution 1564  
While it had been difficult to get an agreement on Resolution 1556, it seemed to 
be increasingly more difficult to decide what to do when the 30-day deadline had passed. 
Jan Pronk, the Special Representative Secretary General of the United Nations in 
Khartoum, presented the Secretary General Report on Sudan to the Security Council on 
September 2. Mr. Pronk reported that although the government forces had not breached 
the ceasefire, the government had failed to disarm the Janjaweed.135 Furthermore, Pronk 
reported, that there had been “no systematic improvement of people’s security and no 
progress on ending the impunity”136 In the face of inaction, Pronk voiced concern with 
the lack of protection for the people in Darfur. In finding the Government of Sudan in 
breach of Resolution 1556, the Security Council had to decide how to recognize the 
violation and what measures to impose.  
The response to Sudan’s failure to comply was put forth in a draft resolution 
sponsored by the United States, Germany, Romania and the United Kingdom. Resolution 
1564 was approved on September 18 with 11 votes in favour and four abstentions. The 
resolution explicitly declared that the Government of Sudan failed to meet its previous 
commitment in the July 3 Communiqué and did not comply with Resolution 1556. In 
result, the Security Council decided to,  
“...consider taking additional measures as contemplated in Article 41 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, such as actions to affect Sudan’s petroleum sector 
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and the Government of Sudan or individual members of the Government of 
Sudan, in order to take effective action to obtain such full compliance or full 
cooperation.” 137 
 
The resolution did not implement sanctions against the Government of Sudan for its 
failure to comply. The language in Resolution 1564 was stronger than in Resolution 1556 
and mentions targeted sanctions that will be made against the Government of Sudan and 
individuals if it fails to act quickly.  Although the resolution failed to punish the 
Government of Sudan, it did establish an international commission of inquiry to 
investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law 
in Darfur. The resolution also reaffirmed the Security Council’s commitment to 
sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and the independence of Sudan.”138 
China abstained from the vote on Resolution 1564 along with Algeria, Pakistan 
and Russia. The decision to abstain was to show dissatisfaction with the drafted 
resolution. Mr. Wang Guangya of China repeated the arguments from the previous 
discussion on Resolution 1556, insisting that the only possible resolution to the Darfur 
conflict was to have a political settlement. Furthermore, the Security Council should 
focus on “encouraging the Sudanese Government to continue to cooperate, rather than 
doing the opposite.”139 This position on sanctions against the Government of Sudan was, 
according to Mr. Wang Guangya, the Chinese standard policy on all sanctions as it is 
believed that sanctions only make problems “even more complicated.”140  
While it was expected that the United States would take a strong stance on 
imposing sanctions against the Government of Sudan, the United States surprised 
observers by taking a moderate position.141 Ambassador Danforth on behalf of the United 
States argued that the Government of Sudan was to blame for the “largest humanitarian 
disaster in the world today.” It was a disaster “fabricated by the Government –intent on 
revenge, intent on persecution, intent on breaking the spirit of an entire people – as an 
over-reaction to a rebellion.”142  In demanding a resolution to the conflict, Ambassador 
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Danforth argued that, “the Government of Sudan has the responsibility to end the tragedy 
in Darfur.” In other words, the United States was willing to blame the Government of 
Sudan for the conflict in Darfur and insisted that the responsibilities to end the conflict 
were with the Government of Sudan.  
The statements made by Ambassador Danforth resulted in a angry response from 
Elfatih Mohamed Ahmed Erwa, speaking on behalf of Government of Sudan, who argued 
that the targeting of the Government of Sudan was part of a political scheme led by the 
United States which believed “it was the sole conscience of the world.”143 According to 
Mr Erwa, the United States should not point fingers at others because it was responsible 
for injustice in several countries, including Iraq. Ambassador Danforth, not planning to 
speak again decided to respond to these allegations. Ambassador Danforth argued that the 
Government of Sudan had missed the point of the deliberations, which was how to 
protect the people of Darfur who were under attack by the Government of Sudan. It was 
evident that the American approach with regards to imposing sanctions against the 
Government of Sudan impacted inter-governmental relations, and that the tensions 
between the two countries had increased.  
 
3.4 Resolution 1591 
It was six months before the Security Council adopted another resolution to 
follow up on the threats set forth in Resolution 1564 in September 2004.  This was not a 
reflection of an improving situation in Darfur. Already within two weeks of the approval 
of resolution 1564, Mr. Pronk could report to the Security Council that there had been 
“no systematic improvement of people’s security and no progress on ending impunity.”144 
By November, Mr. Pronk reported a deteriorating situation and increasing tensions.145 In 
February, the Security Council met to review the report released by the International 
Commission of Inquiry (COI) established by Resolution 1564. In its report, COI found 
the Government of Sudan and Janjaweed were responsible for serious violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law, amounting to crimes under 
international law. Furthermore, the report argued that these violations were so widespread 
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and systematic that they “may constitute crimes against humanity.”146 COI did not find 
evidence that the Government of Sudan was implementing genocide against the people of 
Darfur, but questioned the genocidal intent of some government officials.  These findings 
were supported by Mr. Pronk,147 while China urged the international community to 
ignore the report as its inquirers had failed to receive a VISA invitation from the 
Government of Sudan to enter into Darfur. 148 Though the inquiry’s findings were 
somewhat controversial, they did put more pressure on the Security Council to implement 
sanctions.  
Resolution 1564 specified the petroleum sector in Sudan as a sanctions target if 
the Government of Sudan was not in compliance with its commitments to the Security 
Council. The United States strongly advocated that an oil embargo be included in the 
resolution, but this was quickly rejected by China and Russia.149 Resolution 1591 was 
adopted on March 29, 2005 with China, Russia and Algeria abstaining from the vote. The 
resolution did not include an oil embargo, but rather implemented targeted sanctions 
against individuals “who impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in 
Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights 
law or other atrocities.”150 The individuals would be subject to travel bans or a freeze of 
their financial assets and economic resources. The resolution did not name specific 
individuals, but established a sanctions committee to decide on individuals to be targeted 
and also to oversee the implementations of the sanctions. The Secretary General was also 
to appoint a Panel of Experts to travel regularly to Darfur and other locations in Sudan to 
assist the committee to oversee the implementation of the sanctions and to brief the 
committee. The committee would in return report regularly to the Security Council.151 
The resolution also renewed its request to all member states to prevent sale or supply of 
arms and military equipment to all parties in the conflict. This resolution did not 
specifically target the Government of Sudan, and found that all parties to the conflict had 
failed to comply with previous commitments and resolutions.  
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Chinese Representative Wang Guangya, reiterating statements previously made in 
the Security Council, argued that the Chinese had “always taken a cautious approach to 
the issue of sanctions.” In the case of Darfur, “China has repeatedly stressed that the 
Security Council should exercise the greatest caution with respect to “measures” that 
could make negotiations more difficult and have a negative impact on the peace 
process.”152 The Government of Sudan concurred with the Chinese statements, arguing 
that the Security Council had adopted a series of unwise resolutions that “might make the 
situation worse.”153  Mr. Erwa, speaking on behalf of Sudan, verbally accused the United 
States Congress of being guilty of developing a resolution that was ignorant of African 
peoples and history.154 The representative from the United States, Mr. Holiday, had 
originally not intended to make a statement, but after Mr. Erwa presented the Sudanese 
statement, he decided to speak.  Mr. Holiday defended the United States Congress by 
adding that Congressmen are quite educated on the topic of Darfur, and that “they and all 
of us in the United States hope that this resolution will contribute to an end to the 
violence in Darfur.”155  
 
3.5 Resolution 1779 
It was a long awaited resolution when 1779 was finally adopted on April 25 2006. 
The resolution had been delayed because of difficulties the Security Council had with the 
establishment of the sanctions committee that was established by the previous resolution. 
By January 2006, the committee had largely been inactive and had not developed 
guidelines for its own operation.156 The Panel of Experts had managed to complete their 
mandate, but had found the Government of Sudan and other countries uncooperative in 
providing the necessary information. The Panel of Experts documented their findings in a 
report submitted to the sanctions committee by the end of January 2006. The Panel of 
Experts’ report found several countries (Sudan, Libya, Chad and Eritrea) not complying 
with Security Council resolutions.  In an unprecedented move to a routine procedure, 
China and Qatar decided to block the release of the Panel of Experts’ report to the 
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Security Council.157 After several weeks of discussions, the sanctions committee finally 
released the report to the Security Council in March,158 and provided a list of individuals 
in violation of Resolution 1591. Of the names put forth to the Security Council three of 
the individuals were leaders from rebel groups within Darfur and only one individual was 
a Sudanese government official. Resolution 1779 imposed travel restrictions and froze 
the assets of four Sudanese leaders: Major General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan, 
Commander of the Western Military Region for the Sudanese Air Force; Sheikh Musa 
Hilal, Paramount Chief of the Jalul Tribe in North Darfur; Adam Yacub Shant, Sudanese 
Liberation Army Commander; and Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri, National Movement for 
Reform and Development Field Commander.159  
Resolution 1779 was adopted by a vote of 12 with China, Qatar and Russia 
abstaining. Mr. Wang Guangya repeated China’s stance on imposing sanctions explaining 
that “sanctions cannot reach expected results.”160  China seemed particularly concerned 
with the fact that the Security Council decided to vote on this resolution when the peace 
negotiations were so close to a major deadline. In this regard, the Chinese representative 
argued that the Security Council, 
 “...should focus on promoting and facilitating, rather than affecting and 
interfering in, the peace talks. If, as a result of the Security Council’s sanctions 
resolution, any party to the Abuja talks has second thoughts about signing such a 
peace accord, the conflict in the Darfur region will inevitably be prolonged or 
even intensify. The Security Council would have to assume responsibility for such 
an eventuality.”161  
 
Nonetheless, Mr. Wang Guangya wanted to clarify that China was still, just as all the 
other members, concerned about the Darfur conflict and hoped to see the situation 
neutralized as soon as possible. China believed that a political settlement was the only 
hope for peace in Darfur, and expressed its concern that the Security Council was 
implementing resolutions that went against this goal. Mr. Wang Guangya also took the 
opportunity to make a statement on the discussions that occurred in the Sanctions 
Committee. According to the Chinese official, it was the Panel of Experts’ fault that the 
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report had not been released as it had not provided the committee with enough evidence 
for their findings. As a result, China had no choice but to block the release of the report 
and abstain from the vote on this resolution.162 
The United States countered the argument that the resolution would hamper the 
peace negotiations, stating that it would demonstrate that the Security Council was 
“serious in its efforts to restore peace and security in the region.  Far from interfering in 
the peace process in Abuja, it would strengthen the process.” Furthermore, the American 
Ambassador Bolton argued that the Security Council was taking an important first step in 
“fulfilling its responsibilities under several resolutions respecting Darfur that it has 
adopted.”163 
 
3.6 Sanctions Discussions Continues  
Since the approval of Resolution 1779 and the renewal of the Panel of Experts, 
there have been no other sanctions implemented by the Security Council against the 
parties involved in the Darfur Conflict. According to the watchdog, Security Council 
Reports, a non-governmental organization initiated by the UN to oversee Security 
Council activities, sanctions had been discussed several times unofficially among 
members of the Security Council. Harsher sanctions were discussed repeatedly as a tool 
that could be introduced to pressure parties of the Darfur Conflict that were unwilling to 
take part in the peace negotiations. This approach was strongly advised against by 
African members of the Security Council, and no resolution was drafted.164 The Sanction 
Committee had been somewhat active, and added two additional names to the list of 
individuals subject to travel restrictions and asset freezes in August 2007.165 The 
Government of Sudan also tried to add names from the rebel group JEM to the list in 
February 2008, but was turned down by the Sanction Committee because of lack of 
evidence to support their proposal.166 The Panel of Experts that was established by 
Resolution 1591 was renewed with Resolutions 1651 (2005), 1665 (2006) 1713 (2006), 
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1779 (2007), and 1814 (2008). No official statements were made by China or the United 
Stated during the Security Council vote to renew the Panel of Experts. Since it was first 
established in 2005, the Panel has published six official reports.167 A particularly 
interesting point mentioned in the Panel of Expert’s reports and also in the media has 
been the continuous breaches of the arms embargo.  
The arms embargo established by Resolution 1564, and adopted September 2004, 
requested all member states of the UN to prevent sale or supply of arms and military 
equipment to the parties in the conflict. Though China has continued to argue its 
adherence to the resolution, media investigations and the Panel of Experts’ reports have 
found findings contradicting the Chinese statements. In July 2008, the BBC documentary 
Panorama discredited this claim when they released video evidence that Chinese military 
vehicles and weapons were used by Sudanese troops in Darfur.168 The Panel of Experts’ 
reports released in November 2008 and October 2009 also support these findings. The 
panel documents Chinese manufactured arms and ammunition with production stamps as 
late as 2007 and 2008 within the Darfur region. The report also states that the panel had 
tried to cooperate with the Government of China “to trace the chain of ownership” for the 
sales to the Government of Sudan, but had received no official responses to its 
inquiries.169  
 
3.7 Conclusion  
China and the United States have pursued a particular pattern in all their official 
statements made following the vote of a resolution threatening or implementing sanctions 
against the parties of the Darfur conflict. Though neither abandoned the conclusion that 
the responsibility for solving the conflict remaining with the Government of Sudan, both 
took a different approach on whether to implement sanctions. China never supported the 
resolutions threatening the use or implementation of sanctions against the Government of 
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Sudan, and was silent on whether it supported sanctions being implemented on other 
parties of the Darfur conflict. In essence, the main concern was the possible sanctions to 
be implemented against the Government of Sudan as the official head of a sovereign 
state. Taking this “cautious” approach, the Chinese officials repeated at each vote, the 
Chinese standard policy with regards to sanctions. In the case of Darfur, the Chinese 
officials were concerned with the negative effects the sanctions could have on a possible 
political settlement. It is also important to note that China never accused the Government 
of Sudan of being in violation of the Security Council resolutions or of being one of the 
perpetrators of the atrocities in Darfur. The Chinese lack of support for the imposed 
sanctions was also reflected in the continuous violation of the arms embargo.  
The United States not only supported all the resolutions threatening the use or 
implementation of sanctions, but was one of the sponsors of all the drafted resolutions put 
forth.  In fact, the drafted resolutions proposed by the United States and others often 
suggested stronger sanctions, such as the establishment of an oil embargo. The United 
States repeatedly blamed the Government of Sudan for being responsible for the 
atrocities in Darfur, while also giving the government the responsibility of ending the 
conflict. However, although obviously willing to support sanctions, the United States 
never actually threatened the state sovereignty of Sudan.  
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4. THE SECOND DARFURIAN CHALLANGE TO STATE SOVEREINGTY: 
THE REFERALL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL COURT 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court (the ICC) has been 
described as the “most ambitious initiative in the history of international law.”170 The 
Rome Statute gave the ICC the jurisdiction to prosecute any individual guilty of the most 
profound and serious crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and crimes of aggression. It was the first time jurisdiction was given to an international 
court to prosecute any individual outside of his or her domestic judicial system. 
According to Totten and Tyler, the Rome Statute was a “new and marked infringement 
on the principle of State Sovereignty.”171 It was an infringement because it ended the 
perceived notion that states and their actors had immunity to perform whatever activities 
they wanted within their own territories. All state actors, including a sitting head, could 
be investigated if it was perceived that they had committed serious violations of 
humanitarian international law. However, the ICC does not currently have jurisdiction 
within all the states. According to the Rome Statute, the ICC can only investigate a case 
if it has been referred to them by a state party or by the UN Security Council. As of 
January 2010, there are 110 signatories, and another 38 countries that are still in the 
process of ratifying the Rome Statute. Any one of the 110 signatories can refer a case to 
the ICC, including against a national of a non-state party if the crime was committed 
within the territory of a state-party. Furthermore, if a case is referred to the ICC by the 
Security Council, crimes that occur within the borders of a non-party state can be tried 
and it will be binding to all UN members. The Security Council can refer a case to the 
ICC if the ICC finds the case to be a threat to international peace and security it can 
evoke Chapter VII. This is significant because the ICC thus can challenge the sovereignty 
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of any state as it can theoretically obtain jurisdiction to investigate a case within the 
boarder of any state. 
Since the establishment of the ICC July 2002, it has opened four cases for 
investigation. Three of the cases were referred to the ICC by their own territories; 
Uganda, the Congo and the Central African Republic. The last case was referred by the 
Security Council March 31 2005, who approved Resolution 1593 that requested the ICC 
to investigate possible violations of humanitarian international law in Darfur.172 The 
referral was not approved by the Government of Sudan; a non-state party of the Rome 
Statute. In the immediate aftermath of the approval of Resolution 1593, the Security 
Council released official statements in response to their votes and their stance on the ICC. 
The failure of the Government of Sudan to adhere to Resolution 1593 also pushed the 
Security Council to reluctantly release a presidential statement in June 2008. Members of 
the Security Council also released several statements after the ICC prosecutor delivered 
its regular reports to the Security Council.    
This chapter reviews the arguments made by China and the United States during 
the discussions that took place regarding the adoption of Resolution 1593, the release of 
the Presidential Statement and after the ICC reports to the Security Council. The review 
of the statements provides insight into the stance China and the United States have taken 
towards the ICC as a challenge towards state sovereignty.  
  
4.1 Resolution 1593 
The earlier approval of Resolution 1564 is an important predecessor to Resolution 
1593. Resolution 1564 was adopted by the Security Council on September 18, 2004. The 
primary purpose of the resolution was to respond to the Government of Sudan’s failure to 
comply with Resolution 1556 that demanded that Sudan disarm and apprehend the 
Janjaweed leaders, and try to end the violations of human rights abuses in Darfur. Though 
some were expecting Resolution 1564 to impose sanctions against Sudan, the resolution 
only voiced a threat of the possible use of sanctions. The resolution did however establish 
an international Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate reports of violations of 
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international humanitarian law in Darfur, as discussed earlier. In January 2005, COI 
released its findings that found the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law, including possible “crimes 
against humanity.”173 Though the report did not find the occurrence of genocide, it 
suggested that “in some instances individuals, including government officials, may 
commit acts with genocidal intent.”174 The COI argued that these claims should be 
investigated further by a competent court. The Commission recommended that the court 
should be the ICC as they argued that the Sudanese judicial system was unwilling and 
unable to prosecute the perpetrators.175 The accusations from the COI were very serious 
and the Security Council needed to react. In the next two months the Security Council 
would debate the appropriate measure to take in regards to the Commission’s findings.  
There had never been a referral to the ICC from the Security Council before, and 
the likelihood of a referral looked somewhat bleak with three of the permanent 
members176 not being parties to the Rome Statute. One of the most vocal opponents of the 
ICC among the permanent members has been the United States. In the early and mid 
1990s, the United States was initially supportive regarding the development of an 
international court. The US was also very supportive of the establishment of the 
International Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.177 However, the United States did 
not approve of the Rome Statute that was adopted by the UN General Assembly in July 
1998. The main issue to which the United States objected was the ICC’s prosecution of 
an individual outside the jurisdiction of the individual’s nationality.178 The United States 
was also concerned about the ICC judges not being accountable to a higher authority, and 
that the Security Council would have no veto powers over the ICC investigations. 
Another concern was how the ICC could potentially have a “chilling effect on America’s 
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willingness to project power in the defence of its interests.”179 In other words, the ICC 
could potentially curb certain American activities abroad.  
The dissatisfaction within the Bush Administration was evident given that the US 
started a campaign counter to the ICC in July 2002, only a month after its establishment. 
President George W. Bush announced that the United States would sign bilateral non-
surrender agreements with state parties to ensure that American nationals could not be 
prosecuted within the borders of state parties. The Bush administration went so far as to 
withhold aid and investment funds for over 20 developing countries until the countries 
signed the non-surrender agreements.180 President Bush also made it law that Americans 
were forbidden to pursue any cooperation with the ICC under the Protection Act of 2002. 
The Protection Act also prohibited the United States to participate in peacekeeping 
operations, unless a non-surrender agreement would be signed.181 All these activities 
were targeted to undermine the role and the legitimacy of the ICC.  
 Taken into consideration the United States’ position with regards to the Darfur 
conflict and the possible referral to the ICC, it was no surprise to see that the United 
States was not supportive of this possibility. Rather, the United States argued that the UN 
and the African Union would jointly establish an ad-hoc tribunal to be modeled after the 
UN war-crimes court in Tanzania.182 This proposal was not readily accepted by the other 
members of the Security Council or interest groups within the United States. Colleagues 
in the Security Council argued it would be too costly and time consuming, while 
American interest groups were calling for stronger and appropriate measures be taken to 
what the President himself had recognized as genocide.183 
 The United States was not the only permanent member within the Security 
Council to argue for a different option to that of the ICC. China, also not party to the 
Rome Statute, argued for the complete dismissal of the possibility of an ICC referral. 
Much like the United States, China had also been discontent with the Rome Statute 
approved in 1998. China did not embrace the idea of possible inference within the 
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domestic jurisdiction of a state. China was also concerned with the vague definition of 
the range of different crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. China saw a politicized 
and biased court that would define crimes differently from itself.184 Though China was 
discontent with the Rome Statute, it decided to collaborate with the ICC and continue to 
participate as an observer state in regular meetings of the Assembly of State Parties of the 
Rome Statute.185  
Chinese support for the ICC was also reflected in a statement released by Chinese 
Foreign Affairs October 2003. In the statement, The Chinese government voiced its 
support for the establishment of an “independent, impartial, effective and universal” ICC 
that is “conducive to international peace and security.”186 Nonetheless, China warned that 
the Court should strictly follow the principle upon which the Court was first established, 
namely the principle of complementarity. The principle of complementarity is the notion 
that the ICC is to promote the domestic judicial system and work with countries to 
prosecute criminals within their own judicial systems. The court is to prosecute only the 
gravest international crimes and adhere to the provisions of the UN Charter. Lastly, the 
Court should be objective and without political biases. The statement ended by iterating 
support for the ICC and the rule of law: 
“In the future, the Chinese Government will, as an observer state, continue to 
adopt a serious and responsible attitude to follow carefully the progress and 
operation of the International Criminal Court. China is willing to make due 
contributions to the realization of the rule of law in the international 
community.”187 
 
The Statement provided by Chinese Foreign Affairs makes the impression that China is 
interested in supporting the ICC even though it did not want to approve of all the text 
within the Rome Statute.  
The Chinese approach to the ICC in general was more accommodating and 
understanding than the rather hostile approach taken by the United States. Nonetheless, in 
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response to the COI’s recommendations, China urged the Security Council not to accept 
the referral of the case to the ICC as China believed the domestic courts in Sudan were 
capable of prosecuting the perpetrators and bringing justice to the people of Darfur.188 
China gained support from Russia among the permanent members of the Security 
Council, while Britain and France argued that the referral was “non-negotiable.”189 With 
the permanent members of the Security Council pulling in three different directions, a 
resolution was unlikely. However, after two months of intense debating, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1593, as a Chapter VII resolution, on March 31 2005.  By 
evoking Chapter VII, the Resolution referred the Darfur situation to the prosecutor of the 
ICC. The resolution urged the Government of Sudan to cooperate fully with the 
prosecutor and the court, even though Sudan is not a signatory of the Rome Statute. The 
resolution also invited the prosecutor to report back to the Security Council in three 
months and thereafter every six months. Interestingly, the resolution decided that other 
nationals working within Sudan would be subjected to only the jurisdiction of the 
contributing state and would not be investigated by the ICC.190 The resolution was 
adopted by eleven votes in favour with four abstentions, including Brazil, China, Russia 
and the United States. 
Immediately after the vote, the official representative for the United States Mr. 
Patterson explained that the United States abstained from voting because of its position of 
“long-standing and firm objections and concerns regarding the ICC.”191 The main reason 
for this position is explained by Mr. Patterson;  
“The United States continues to fundamentally object to the view that the ICC 
should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals, including government 
officials, of States not party to the Rome Statute. That strikes at the essence of the 
nature of sovereignty.”192 
 
In essence, the United States was not willing to let the ICC challenge the principle of 
state sovereignty. Moreover, the United States continued to argue that the Rome Statute 
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is flawed by the possibility that non-party state nationals can be prosecuted by the ICC. 
The United States does recognize that this resolution did take into consideration the 
American concerns and did provided for “clear protections for United States persons. The 
resolution ensured that no United States person supporting the operations in the Sudan 
will be subject to investigation or prosecution because of this resolution.”193 Speaking of 
these concerns, Mr. Patterson reflected an obvious antagonism as he warned about the 
possibility of limiting of American collaborative measures because of the referral to the 
ICC as all government officials of the United States are restricted by law from providing 
any assistance and support to the ICC. Furthermore, Mr. Patterson warned that the United 
States would not hesitate to withhold funding or take other actions if the resolution to 
protect American persons from the ICC would not be respected. Nonetheless, with 
regards to the Darfur conflict, Mr. Patterson notes that it is important for the United 
States that there is justice brought to “those responsible for the crimes and atrocities that 
have occurred in Darfur and ending the climate of impunity there. Violators of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law must be held accountable.”194  
 China, also abstaining from the vote, presented their reasoning for their position. 
Mr. Wang argued that the Security Council ignored what was the most feasible and 
efficient solution to the situation in Darfur. According to China, by having the domestic 
judicial system within Sudan prosecuting the perpetrators, it would avoid any negative 
impact of the political settlement and it would be better for the reconciliation. Because of 
these possible positive outcomes and “out of respect for national judicial sovereignty,” 
China “would prefer to see the perpetrators of gross violation of human rights stand trial 
in the Sudanese judicial system.”195 China argued that Sudan has taken measures to 
improve their legal system, and the international community should assist Sudan to 
ensure “justice, transparency and credibility.”196 Mr. Wang also argued that the Security 
Council should have received the Government of Sudan’s approval to refer the case to the 
ICC. In not doing so, China “cannot accept any exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction against 
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the will of non-state parties, and we would find it difficult to endorse any Security 
Council authorization of such an exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.”197   
 
4.3 The ICC Reports to the Security Council  
Immediately following the approval of Resolution 1593, Prosecutor Mr. Luis 
Moreno-Ocampa received from the COI, 2,500 documents and a sealed list with the 
names of 51 individuals that the Commission suspected for violation of humanitarian 
international law.198 At the first Security Council reporting meeting, June 29 2005, the 
prosecutor could already confirm that the seriousness of the crimes were within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The Prosecutor had started reviewing the judicial system within 
Sudan, and all the extra judicial measures adopted by the Government of Sudan. There 
have also been over 100 initial meetings with individuals and groups pertaining to 
information about the Darfur conflict, and a collection of another 3,000 documents.199 
There were no statements made by the members with respect to the first ICC report.  
After the initial reporting meeting, the prosecutor would continue to report to the 
Security Council approximately every six months. By December 2005 the prosecutor 
reported to the Security Council that the Government of Sudan had become 
uncooperative with the ICC.200 Mr. Moreno-Ocampa continued to report about the lack of 
communication and collaboration by the Sudanese government throughout 2006 and 
2007. All collaborative measures ended in February 2007, when the prosecutor delivered 
the first two applications for arrest warrants for the Sudanese Government official Ahmad 
Muhammad Harun and Janjaweed leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (known as 
Ali Kushayb). 201 In April 2007, the arrest warrants were approved and submitted. The 
pre-trial chambers of the ICC charged Harun and Kushayb with 51 counts of crimes 
against humanity.202  
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Mr. Moreno-Ocampa reported to the Security Council the following month after 
the arrest warrants, stating that the Government of Sudan had not collaborated with the 
ICC with the arrest warrants. In fact, it seemed like the Government of Sudan had started 
a campaign to sideline the ICC. After receiving the arrest warrants, the Government of 
Sudan promoted Mr. Harun to the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs.203 The 
prosecutor asked the Security Council and other international partners to encourage the 
Government of Sudan to arrest and surrender the two perpetrators as soon as possible. 
The Security Council failed to respond with official statements or actions.204 While there 
seemed to be little support from the Security Council, the ICC found itself under attack 
by the Government of Sudan which argued the ICC had no jurisdiction within Sudan and 
was therefore infringing on its sovereignty: because the ICC had no jurisdiction, there 
was also no need for Sudan to collaborate. Furthermore, the Government of Sudan started 
rallying support from other African and Arabian countries against what it argued was a 
“neo-colonial institution” focused on punishing Sudan and Africa. The ICC, according to 
the Government, was only a political tool being used in an “exercise of the culture of 
superiority’’ upon the weaker states.205  
 The Government of Sudan was not successful in derailing the ICC. In December 
2007, Mr. Moreno-Ocampa delivered another report to the Security Council about new 
investigations, including of an attack on a peacekeeper by possible rebel fighters. The 
main focus of the report was the unwillingness of the Government of Sudan to 
collaborate with the ICC. The prosecutor reminded the Security Council that Sudan was 
actually repeatedly challenging the Security Council’s decision to give jurisdiction to the 
ICC. The prosecutor ended his report with one request: 
“I ask the Security Council for consistency. I ask the Security Council to send a 
strong and unanimous message today to the Government of the Sudan, requesting 
compliance with resolution 1593 (2005), requesting the execution of the arrest 
warrants… The Council can make a difference; it can break the criminal system. 
What is at stake is, quite simply, the life or death of 2.5 million people.”206 
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To this request, the members of the Security Council responded with statements of 
support for the prosecutor and the ICC. The United States was one of the members of the 
Security Council that voiced its strong support for the prosecutor, though it did remind 
the Security Council of its position towards the Rome Statute. As requested by the 
prosecutor, the United States called upon the Government of Sudan to collaborate fully 
with the ICC as requested by Resolution 1593. In the case of Darfur, the United States 
“believes strongly in the need for accountability for acts of genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity committed in Darfur.”207 Mr. DeLaurentis ended the statement 
on behalf of the United States by suggesting that it would work with other members of 
the Council to determine concrete next steps.208 
The Chinese official, Mr. Zhenmin, did provide some support to the ICC, but also 
warned the prosecutor not to discontinue its communication and collaboration with 
Sudan. Mr. Zhenmin’s statement came across much more as a cautionary word against 
the prosecutor’s approach to the investigation in Darfur. Mr. Zhenmin argued that the 
ICC was working on the basis of a Security Council Resolution mandate, and therefore 
should also be considering the overall political and security situations. The current 
approach taken by the prosecutor was “most unlikely to result in cooperation and support 
from the Sudanese Government. It would also hardly be conducive to the overall efforts 
of the international community to resolve the problem of Darfur.”209 The statement from 
the Chinese representative came across as an attack on the Prosecutor and his approach to 
the conflict in Darfur.  
The statements made by China and the United States at the December reporting 
meeting in 2007 were the first statements with regards to the ICC since the approval of 
the Resolution 1593 almost three years earlier. The statements reflected a change of tone 
towards the ICC with both China and the United States: the United States being less 
hostile towards the ICC while China being more so. Though the United States did motion 
that they would be willing to work on concrete steps to take towards the uncooperative 
nature of the Government of Sudan, there were no measures or actions taken by the 
Security Council following this reporting meeting. However, according to Security 
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Council Report, there was a presidential statement drafted by the European members of 
the Security Council that gained no support and was laid to rest.210  
 
4.4 The Security Council Responds  
The silence that had lasted almost 3.5 years finally ended when the Security 
Council released a presidential statement June 16 2008. The decision to release the 
statement came after Mr. Moreno-Ocampa had reported to the Security Council that, “the 
entire Darfur region is a crime scene.”211 Relations with the Government of Sudan had 
not improved as the government continuously insisted that the ICC had no jurisdiction 
within Sudan.  The prosecutor also reported that the ICC investigations had found “no 
trace of Sudanese proceedings in relations to the crimes in Darfur during the last three 
years.”212 The ICC received a confirmation from the Government of Sudan that said there 
were no cases.213  The prosecutor called upon the Security Council to send a strong 
message to the Government of Sudan by issuing a presidential statement. The prosecutor 
ended by reminding the Security Council that “silence has never helped or protected 
victims. Silence only helps the criminals.”214  
In response to the prosecutor’s report, China was less hostile than its previous 
statement. The Chinese official, Mr. Yifan, voiced China’s support for the ICC in 
“appropriately resolving the problem of impunity in Darfur.”215 The appropriate approach 
is repeatedly mentioned for the ICC to be a “supplement to the domestic juridical system 
of the state,” letting the domestic courts be the “main channel.” Nonetheless, the Chinese 
put pressure on the Sudanese Government to enhance its communication with the ICC, 
strengthen cooperation, establish mutual trust and jointly resolve the problem of impunity 
in Darfur.”216 This was a clear shift from the previous Chinese statement, which blamed 
the ICC for lack of effort in eliciting cooperation from the Government of Sudan. 
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 Mr. Khalilzad, on behalf of the United States, was the President of the Security 
Council for the month of June, and concluded the Security Council discussions by 
presenting a statement for the United States:  
“The United States strongly believes that those responsible for the acts of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur must be 
held accountable and be brought to justice. We look forward to continuing to 
work with other members of the Council on necessary steps, including working 
with Costa Rica on a draft presidential statement to achieve that important 
objective.”217 
 
The United States acknowledged that the ICC would be the institution that would 
investigate and prosecute the crimes in Darfur. The United States did not mention that it 
would like to see anyone else investigate the cases or that the domestic judicial system 
within Sudan should handle the cases. It is also important to note that for the first time 
during all the statements made by the United States during the Security Council 
discussions on the topic of the ICC and its investigation in Darfur, the representative did 
not reiterate the American justification for its position against the ICC.  
Immediately after the reporting meeting, Costa Rica drafted a presidential 
statement and started negotiating support for the draft. There was solid support from the 
state parties of the Rome Statute, the European countries, and as well, from the United 
States. The opposition to the draft was led by China and included Russia and Libya. The 
main concerns voiced by the opposition camp were the possible impact on the political 
negotiations and the need for the Sudanese court to be the main channel for 
prosecutions.218 Following intense negotiations and several drafts, the Security Council 
released the Statement by the President of the Security Council on June 16, 2008 urging 
“the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur to cooperate fully 
with the court, consistent with resolution 1593 (2005), in order to put an end to impunity 
for the crimes.”219 The statement also recognized the efforts by the prosecutor of the ICC 
of trying to bring justice to Darfur, and its efforts to work with the Government of Sudan 
with the arrest warrants and investigations. The statement also included a short reminder 
of the principle of complementarity to which the ICC is to adhere.   
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Although the presidential statement included rather soft language and no threats 
concerning Sudan’s unwillingness to cooperate, it indicated continued support for the 
ICC to investigate the Darfur atrocities. Particularly noticeable was the support provided 
by the United States, as the acting President of the Security Council, to put the issue on 
the meeting agenda and ensure that the statement was released. This was the strongest 
gesture of support that the United States had provided the ICC in its short history.220 
Meanwhile, although it was obvious that the Sudanese judicial courts were not able or 
willing to prosecute the perpetrators in Darfur, the Chinese delegation still pushed for the 
right of the Sudanese judicial system to handle the cases.   
 
4.5 A Presidential Arrest Warrant  
 Within a month after the release of the presidential statement, Mr. Moreno-
Ocampa surprised the majority of the international community by filing an application for 
a warrant of arrest for the President of Sudan, Omar Haasan Ahmed Al-Bashir, to the 
judges of the ICC. It was the first time that a sitting head of a government was charged 
with violations of international humanitarian law, including crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and genocide. The prosecutor’s application should not have been a surprise to the 
Security Council, as the prosecutor had informed the Security Council about the 
upcoming arrest warrant at the previous reporting meeting in June. The prosecutor had 
said “I will proceed to the judges in July and present my evidence on who are those most 
responsible for the crimes described.”221 The Government of Sudan strongly opposed the 
arrest warrant application and warned the international community about the 
consequences of the ICC actions, including the peace reconciliations and humanitarian 
operations in Darfur.222 The international humanitarian aid and human rights community 
already involved in Darfur, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
celebrated the possible arrest warrant as an important step in international humanitarian 
law.223 Regional organizations were divided. The EU called upon the Government of 
                                                        
220 Peskin, 318. 
221 The United Nations Security Council, S/PV. 5905 , (June 5, 2008) 4. 
222 Security Council Report, Sudan/Darfur August 2008, (August, 2008).  
223 Arieff and others, 11.  
 57 
 
Sudan to cooperate with the prosecutor and the Court,224 while the AU and the Arab 
League urged the ICC to defer the warrant.225  
The same divisions seen in the international community were also present among 
the permanent members of the Security Council. China immediately started working 
against the prosecutor’s application by arguing for the implementation of Article 16 of 
the Rome Statute.226 The approval of Article 16 by the Security Council could delay an 
ICC investigation or prosecution for a period of 12 months, renewable thereafter.227 
China did not want to be the main initiator behind the implementation of Article 16 and 
the delay an ICC investigation as it was already being strongly reprimanded by the media 
for its human rights stance in the months before the opening of the summer Olympics in 
Beijing. Instead, China tried to push African and Arab member countries of the Security 
Council to call upon the use of Article 16 for the purpose of international peace and 
security.228 Unexpected support was also found among other members of the Security 
Council with Britain and France, two of the strongest supporters of the ICC. Britain and 
France had both lobbied the EU to support the ICC and the warrant, but were willing to 
discuss the possibility of making a deal with the Government of Sudan. If the 
Government of Sudan would be willing to hand over Mr. Harun and Mr. Kushayb, 
Britain and France would be willing to support an Article 16 resolution. The negotiations 
regarding this possible deal ended in October 2008 as the Government of Sudan was 
unwilling to hand over the two suspects. 229  
The discussions around a possible Article 16 resolution took a sharp turn when 
the United States announced it would not support such a resolution. Resolution 1828, 
which was supposed to renew the mandate for African Union/United Nations Hybrid 
operation in Darfur (UNAMID), included language about the Security Council being 
concerned about the ICC arrest warrant requests.230 While the Resolution was approved 
with 14 votes in favour, the United States abstained from the vote because of the 
                                                        
224 Ibid, 11 
225 Ibid, 18. 
226 Peskin 320 
227 International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (July 1, 2002), 12. 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Rome+Statute.htm  
228 Peskin, 309 
229 Peskin, 310 
230 Security Council Report, Sudan/Darfur September 2008,(September 2008).   
 58 
 
inclusion of the language mentioning the ICC arrests concerns. Speaking on behalf of the 
United States, Mr. Wolff, argued that the language in the resolution was sending the 
wrong message to the Government of Sudan. Furthermore, the “United States felt it was 
time to stand up on this point of moral clarity and make clear that this Permanent 
Member of the Security Council will not compromise on the issue of justice.”231 The 
degree of support provided by the United Stated to the ICC had now surpassed that of the 
other permanent members of the Security Council.  
When Mr. Moreno-Ocampa met with the Security Council in December 2008, he 
provided a better explanation for the case he had made against President Al-Bashir. In 
particular, the prosecutor shared evidence that the president had ordered attacks on 
certain people in Darfur in March 2003. When giving his orders, President Al-Bashir 
stated “I want no prisoners or wounded, only scorched earth”232 The prosecutor reminded 
the Security Council that the decision was now up to the judges of the ICC. If the judges 
decided to issue the arrest warrant against the president, the prosecutor warned that the 
Security Council must act united. Mr. Moreno-Ocampa advised the international 
community not to try to conceal the crimes. “President Al-Bashir’s criminal actions 
should not be ignored. Statements of ceasefires followed by bombings, denial of mass 
rapes or promises of justice while torturing the witnesses should not be supported. The 
international community cannot be part of any cover-up of genocide or crimes against 
humanity.”233  
In response to the prosecutor’s report, China and the United States reiterated the 
arguments stated earlier in the Security Council meetings. China continued to argue for a 
solution that would support the political reconciliation ongoing in Darfur. As before, 
China argued that the approach taken by the prosecutor and the ICC is harmful for this 
process. The prosecutor has with the arrest warrants for the president caused serious 
repercussions for the peace process. China continued to insist that the Government of 
Sudan is working on ending the impunity in Darfur through its national apparatus.234  
While China reiterated its dedication to peace and security in Sudan, the United States 
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seems to have seriously embraced the role as the new moral leader within the Security 
Council. Ms. DiCarlo argued that the United States “remains steadfastly committed to 
promoting the rule of law and helping to bring violators of international humanitarian law 
to justice, and it will continue to take a leadership role in righting those wrongs.”235 The 
United States also reiterated that its dedication to justice could be seen through its actions 
in this case, and that there should be no doubt about these commitments.236  
 On March 4 2009, the judges of the ICC came to a final decision and issued an 
arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir for five counts of crimes against humanity and two 
counts of war crimes. Two of the three judges did not find reasonable grounds for the 
genocide conviction, while the third judge thought otherwise and wrote a dissent paper 
for why she believed it was a genocide.237 Immediately following the decision, the 
prosecutor filled an appeal for the genocide conviction. The appeal has not to this date 
been reviewed by the ICC judges. The response from the Government of Sudan was as 
expected.  The government said that this “decision is exactly what we have been 
expecting from the court, which was created to target Sudan and to be part of the new 
mechanism of neo-colonialism.”238 President Al-Bashir responded by telling the ICC that 
they could eat the warrant, and that the warrant was “not worth the ink it is written on.”239 
The most unfortunate part of the response from the Government of Sudan was the 
expulsion of foreign aid agencies in Darfur. The day after the arrest warrant, Al-Bashir 
expelled 10 aid agencies. This decision was taken according to Al-Bashir because Sudan 
was as a “responsible government.”240 A series of warnings were also released by 
Sudanese government officials threatening the safety of peacekeepers and UN personnel 
in Sudan.241   
 China’s Department of Foreign Affairs decided to hold a press conference the day 
after the arrest warrant was released to clarify China’s position. Speaking to the media 
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Qin Gang, a spokesman for Foreign Affairs, said that it was the role of the international 
community to foster peace and stability in the region, and not to take decisions that will 
negatively affect this. China did recognize that judicatory justice is important, she said, 
but it should not be “acquired at the cost of peaceful process in the region.”242 China was 
concerned about how this will affect the future reconciliation process, as pointed out by 
Qin: “If the President was a criminal, how could the opposition faction consider him as a 
credible negotiator to seek political reconciliation?”243 
 In November 2008, Barack Obama, a Democrat, was elected President of the 
United States. In the months leading up to the election, Obama had been quite outspoken 
regarding the Darfur conflict stating in a November 2007 interview that the United States 
had a moral obligation to stop the genocide in Darfur.244 With Obama entering office it 
was uncertain if Obama’s dedication to pursue justice in Darfur would continue.  
Nonetheless, after taking office in January 2009, the Obama administration argued was 
that, in Sudan, “those that have committed atrocities should be held accountable.”245 It 
also started a foreign policy review on the American stance toward the ICC. Speaking 
about the review, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “Whether we work toward 
joining or not, we will end hostility toward the ICC and look for opportunities to 
encourage effective ICC action in ways that promote U.S. interests by bringing war 
criminals to justice.”246 In response to the warrant and the expulsion of the aid agencies, 
President Obama stated that “It is not acceptable to put that many people’s lives at 
risk...We need to be able to get those humanitarian organizations back on the ground.”247 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued that President Bashir “would have a chance to 
have his day in court if he believes that the indictment is wrongly charged. He can 
certainly contest it.”248  
 Mr. Moreno-Ocampa continued to report to the Security Council throughout 
2009. The message was the same; the Government of Sudan continued to not cooperate 
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with the ICC or its investigations. At the December 2009 reporting meeting, China and 
the United States both made statements after the report was completed.  The United 
States made the strongest statement for the ICC, and the investigations in Darfur to this 
date, as Ms. DiCarlo stated;   
“Those responsible for these atrocities must be held accountable. We urge all 
States, including those not party to the Rome Statute, to refrain from providing 
political or financial support to Sudanese suspects indicted by the ICC. Although 
the United States is not party to the Rome Statute, it was pleased to participate last 
week for the first time as an observer in the Assembly of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute. That decision reflected the United States commitment to engage 
with the international community on issues that affect our foreign policy interests. 
Ending impunity for crimes against humanity, including crimes on the staggering 
scale of those committed in Darfur, ranks high among our commitments. The 
United States will therefore continue to be supportive of the ICC’s prosecution of 
these cases to the extent consistent with United States domestic law.”249 
 
The United States did not only strongly supported the ICC, but also encouraged other 
states that are non party to the Rome Statute to support the ICC’s quest for justice. It was 
also a new development that the United States was attending the Assembly of States 
Parties meeting. The statement provided by the United States and its decision to attend 
the meetings of the Assembly of States Parties reflected the new position of the Obama 
Administration towards the ICC.  
 In China’s statement to the Security Council, Mr. Zhenmim, summarized the 
Chinese position towards the Darfur conflict.  
“Over the past several years, the Security Council has considered the question of 
Darfur in the Sudan many times. During those considerations, the Chinese 
delegation has always emphasized the viewpoint that the Darfur issue involves a 
political process, peacekeeping deployment, economic development, 
humanitarian assistance and justice. It is very complex and requires tremendous 
political wisdom to find a comprehensive solution that ensures that peace and 
justice are achieved.”250 
 
In that respect, China hoped that the prosecutor would recognize all these complexities 
and would “objectively review the latest developments and various challenges on the 
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Darfur question, and contribute to the comprehensive and proper settlement of the Darfur 
issue.”251  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
Before the discussion surrounding the ICC investigation of the Darfur atrocities 
started in the Security Council, China and the United States had a prescribed policy 
towards the ICC. The two countries had similar justifications for their stance against the 
Rome Statute; mainly the interference within state sovereignty by overstepping the 
domestic judicial system. Still, they had to decide to take two different approaches to deal 
with the establishment of the ICC. China decided to keep relations friendly with the ICC 
and continue to be involved in its developments as an observer state. The United States 
under the leadership of President Bush decided to ensure the American interests were 
supported, while also deliberately undermining the role of the ICC. The Chinese and 
American policy towards the ICC coloured their actions and statements made in the 
Security Council. 
Throughout the discussions in the Security Council on the topic of the ICC and 
investigations in Darfur maintained persistent pressure, China persistently encouraged the 
use of the domestic judicial system in Sudan on the grounds of the principle of 
complementarity. China also tried to gain international support for this argument by 
arguing that this solution was the only solution that would support the political 
reconciliation and security in Darfur. China continued to use this argument after the COI 
and the ICC had found the Sudanese courts unable and unwilling to obtain justice for the 
victims in Darfur. While the Government of Sudan continued to be uncooperative with 
the ICC, China argued that it was the ICC to blame for its approach to the Government of 
Sudan that had resulted in this behaviour. During the discussions surrounding the 
Presidential Statement July 2008, the Chinese language did soften towards the ICC and 
encouraged the Government of Sudan to strengthen its cooperation and communication 
with the ICC. This was arguably because of the pressure the Chinese government was 
receiving from the international community with the upcoming Olympic Games in 
August 2008. After the pressure dissipated from the international community, China 
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returned to the same arguments and justifications against the ICC. During all the Security 
Council meetings, China consistently argued against the possible threat of the ICC 
against the sovereignty of Sudan.  
The United States’ stance on the ICC investigations in Darfur changed 
significantly from the Security Council referral in March 2005 to the ICC reporting 
meeting December 2009. At first, it was seen as a watershed event when the United 
States let Resolution 1594 pass and the referral to the ICC be implemented. Nonetheless, 
the United States was sure to voice its strong discontent with the Resolution and the role 
of the ICC in the investigations. Three and a half years later, the United States presided 
over the Security Council when the Presidential Statement was released urging the 
Government of Sudan to cooperate indicated significant and newfound American support 
for the ICC.  This was the first recognizable shift in American policy regarding the ICC. 
The new policy continued to be strengthened within the next month as the United 
States blocked the possible vote on Article 16. Suddenly, the state that had been the 
strongest opponent to the ICC had become its most reliant supporter within the Security 
Council. As noted by the United States, it had decided to take the moral high ground. The 
argument used for this stance was that the United States wanted to see those responsible 
for the crimes to be held accountable. It is important to note that, though there was also a 
recognizable shift towards more support for the ICC when President Obama entered 
office, the shift in policy occurred before he became president. While the United States 
did at first find the ICC to be a threat to the “essence of the nature of sovereignty,” it has 
since recognized the need for the ICC to breach the sovereignty rights of Sudan to bring 
justice to Darfur region.  
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5. THE THIRD DARFURIAN CHALLANGE TO STATE SOVEREINGTY:  
THE DEPLOYMENT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
In stark contrast to the Cold War era, the Security Council evoked Chapter VII more 
than a dozen times in the 1990s in response to several severe humanitarian disasters 
occurring in Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor and Kosovo.252 The sharp increase of the use 
of Chapter VII correlated with a sharp increase of UN peacekeeping mission. Though the 
UN have to date had 64 peacekeeping missions, 51 of the missions have been after 
1988.253 The nature of peacekeeping missions has also changed, and peacekeepers have 
been increasing asked to take upon new roles. The new roles included all ranges between 
providing military support for the protection of civilians to building social institutions for 
education and health care. Modern UN peacekeeping missions were no longer only about 
monitoring a negotiated truce, but about ‘peacemaking’ by facilitating and negotiating the 
political process. It was also about rebuilding a country after conflict, namely, 
‘peacebuilding,’ including restoring communities and the rule of law.254 The new 
multidimensional peacekeeping missions are today providing more pressures on state 
sovereignty than the traditional peacekeeping missions did in the past. The modern 
peacekeeping missions will in some cases take over the role of a state, including such 
roles providing a judicial system or policing. Modern peacekeeping has therefore been 
seen as one of the most intrusive challenges to state sovereignty.  
The sharp increase of the use of Chapter VII and peacekeeping missions could be 
interpreted as a shift in international law in which humanitarian disasters were seen as 
just cause for intervention in a functioning state. Nonetheless, the Security Council has 
never intervened for humanitarian purposes in a fully functioning state without its 
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consent.255 This is a reflection of the Security Council’s unwillingness to breach the 
principle of non-intervention even when faced with the worst humanitarian disasters. The 
unwillingness to breach the principle of non-intervention without the government’s 
consent has also complicated the response to the Darfur conflict.  
Over the last decade there have been two separate conflicts in southern and western 
Sudan that have required peacekeeping support from outside the country’s borders. The 
United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was authorized by Resolution 1590 (2005) to 
support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (also known as the 
Naivasha Agreement) signed between the government of Sudan and rebel forces in 
southern Sudan. Resolution 1590 included only the southern region and did not give the 
UNMIS a mandate to monitor the situation in the western region of Darfur, though the 
conflict had already been ongoing for years. It was the African Union (AU) that had first 
reacted and sent a monitoring team into Darfur as early as April 2004. Before the end of 
the year, the AU had expanded the monitoring team to a peacekeeping force, named the 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), with a mandated force of about 7,000 strong. 
This was the first official AU peacekeeping operation, and the expectations were high. 
Nonetheless, the success of AMIS was threatened by its lack of experience among the 
troops and limited resources to pay for troops and equipment.256 In result, the AU 
peacekeeping force was stretched too thin, and struggled to keep its mandate within 
Darfur. When the AMIS mandate came to its end in September 2006, the AU announced 
that it was not willing to continue its mission and called upon the UN to take the 
leadership in Darfur.257   
When first discussing the need to begin a peacekeeping operation in Darfur, the 
Security Council had considered three options. First, it could expand the peacekeeping 
operations of the UNMIS in Southern Sudan to the eastern Darfur region. The second 
option was to seek a partnership with the AU peacekeeping mission, which was 
struggling to keep its mandate within Darfur. Third, the Security Council could approve a 
new peacekeeping operation to enter Darfur. When reviewing the Security Council 
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meeting records, it is noted that all these options were discussed at different times within 
the Security Council and all options were presented as viable solutions to the ongoing 
humanitarian disaster in Darfur. However, each of the options would violate the non-
intervention principle if the Government of Sudan withheld consent. This chapter will 
review the discussions the Security Council had regarding the peacekeeping options, and 
how it dealt with the possible breach of the sovereign powers of Sudan during 2004 and 
2009. Special attention will be given to the statements made by the officials from 
Washington and Beijing. It should be noted that the chapter will also use the term 
peacekeeping in an overarching term to describe all the multidimensional tasks 
prescribed to a modern peacekeeping force, including peacemaking and peacebuilding.    
 
5.2 Resolution 1706  
The Darfur conflict by January 2004 was already coined as one of the worst humanitarian 
disasters in the world by UN officials.258 In the following months, a debate erupted as to 
whether the conflict should be defined as genocide. In September the United States 
became the first country to declare the atrocities to be of genocidal intent.259  Though not 
everyone was willing to use the genocide description, there was overall recognition that 
the conflict was a humanitarian disaster. Regardless of the seriousness of the conflict, the 
Security Council saw no need for the UN to take a leadership role. In fact, the Security 
Council continued to voice support for the AU and an “African solution to an African 
problem.”260 The Security Council released a presidential statement May 12, 2005 that 
applauded the “vital leadership role” of the AU in Darfur.261  At the same time it was 
becoming more evident that the AU peacekeeping force AMIS was struggling to keep its 
mandate in Darfur. In January 2006, the AU released a communiqué that welcomed a 
transition to a UN peacekeeping operation.262 Responding to the AU communiqué, the 
Security Council released a presidential statement in February 2006 asking Secretary 
General Kofi Annan to initiate the planning process to transition from an AU led 
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peacekeeping operation to a UN led operation.  The Secretary General was to assess the 
current AMIS structure and evaluate how to possibly reallocate UNMIS resources to 
include the Darfur region.263 While the Secretary General was assessing the situation, the 
parties of the Darfur conflict signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on May 5, 2006. 
Following the signing, the AU announced its decision to end the AMIS mandate 
September 30, 2006, with the possibility of lengthening the mission as long as a transition 
agreement was reached before this date.264   
In the meantime, the Secretary General worked hard to develop a transition plan 
for the UN to take over from the AU. The task soon became much more difficult than 
first anticipated. The Government of Sudan strongly objected to the transition, and argued 
for the AU to continue to lead the operation. As a last resort, the government would agree 
to let the UN provide some support to strengthen the AMIS operation, but would not let 
the UN take over the lead of the operation. The Secretary General continued to invest 
huge diplomatic efforts to gain governmental consent during the spring and summer 
months, but was unsuccessful.265 The Secretary General released his recommendations on 
July 2006 without having the consent of the Government of Sudan and therefore without 
a completed transition plan.  The Secretary General advised the Security Council to 
immediately strengthen the AMIS operations which would increase the chances for 
success of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).266 For the transition, the Secretary 
General recommended that the UNMIS operations should be expanded to include the 
Darfur Region as of January 1, 2007. The main mandate of the operations would be to 
promote and support the implementation of the DPA, with the “overarching aim of 
assisting the Sudanese to bring peace and development to the entire country.”267 
Furthermore, the Secretary General insisted that “the United Nations cannot take over full 
peacekeeping responsibilities in the region until it has the consent and cooperation of the 
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Government of Sudan.”268 In concluding remarks, the Secretary General urged the 
Security Council and the international community to focus their efforts to gain consent 
from the Government of Sudan.269 
After the report was released, the Security Council had to decide how to proceed. 
Although, peacekeeping missions were regularly approved by the Security Council in the 
1990s, peacekeeping operations discussions still initiated debate among members of the 
Security Council. Two of the members of the Security Council, China and the United 
States, were very vocal on the topic. Since the 1990s, China had generally supported 
peacekeeping missions, but was apprehensive about the long-term implications regarding 
state sovereignty. China has remained consistent in its approach to peacekeeping and has 
maintained that interference within the internal affairs of a sovereign state is a violation 
of the UN Charter, in particular Chapter 1 Article 4 (that opposes the use of force against 
a sovereign state).270  While speaking on this topic, former Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 
reaffirmed China’s position: 
“It is our consistent view that peacekeeping operations should strictly conform to 
the principles of the UN Charter and the norms of international relations. Such 
operations should be undertaken only with the consent and cooperation of the 
parties concerned, and an impartial and unbiased attitude must be maintained. No 
peacekeeping operations or humanitarian aid programs should be permitted to 
interfere in the internal affairs of any country, still less to use force and get 
embroiled in a conflict between the parties.”271 
 
If a proposed peacekeeping operation fit within this policy framework, China would have 
been more likely to approve a Security Council resolution. Since 2000 China has become 
more active in providing military support for peacekeeping missions, including 
peacekeeping support in Haiti and Sudan. In fact, China has deployed more troops and 
police to UN peacekeeping operations than any other of the five permanent members of 
the Security Council as of March 2010.272 When peacekeeping missions have occurred 
outside UN, China has often been a vocal opponent. China spoke strongly against the 
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NATO military invasion into former Yugoslavia and the American invasion of 
Afghanistan (although China currently has troops in Afghanistan in the UN peacekeeping 
force).273 Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that China is willing to ignore its stand on 
peacekeeping if it is to clash with its national interests. Such was the case when China 
vetoed the renewal of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia 
as the country had recently recognized Taiwan.274 
In May 2006, before the Secretary General’s recommendations on the transition 
were released, China made a statement regarding its stance on the issue. The Chinese 
representative to the Security Council, Mr. Zhang Yishan, disclosed: 
“We believe that, if the United Nations is to deploy a peacekeeping operation in 
Darfur, the agreement and cooperation of the Sudanese Government must be 
obtained. That is a basic principle and precondition for the deployment of all 
United Nations peacekeeping operations.”275 
China insisted that consent of the Government of Sudan was crucial to any resolutions, 
and asked the Security Council not to hasten any decisions without the consent. Without 
the consent, it would be a breach of the Sudanese sovereign rights. The Chinese stance on 
peacekeeping was much different from that of the Americans.  
In the early 1990s, the United States was one of the leading peacekeeping nations. 
Both the American presidents of that decade, George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, 
supported the United States taking an active role in peacekeeping operations around the 
world. The United States was a key player in peacekeeping missions as they provided the 
main air lift capacity, technology and military strength.276 Though the American forces 
did experience success, it was the disastrous events of the Somalian civil war that would 
taint the rest of the decade and the American policies towards peacekeeping. In October 
1993, the intense fighting within Somalia led to 18 American peacekeepers’ brutal 
deaths, including decapitations and dead bodies being dragged from cars in the streets.277 
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The American lesson learned was to be more cautious regarding where to deploy 
peacekeeping forces, especially in the case of civil wars. The new American cautious 
approach to peacekeeping was months later blamed for the slow response to the Rwandan 
genocide as the United States continuously blocked resolutions in the Security Council.278 
Although the United States continued to be active in the UN peacekeeping mission 
throughout the 1990s, President Clinton did so without congressional or political support. 
On the day of his inauguration, President George W. Bush responded to the American 
political pressures and announced his intentions to reduce American commitments 
abroad.279 Soon thereafter, the war on terror became the main focus of the Bush 
administration and provided a good justification for redirecting resources away from 
peacekeeping missions.280   
 In the spring months of 2006, while the Secretary General was working on the 
transition plan, the United States published its National Security Strategy. In this report, 
the Bush administration clarified its stance on peacekeeping, which is referred to in this 
document as “conflict intervention.” The report argued that “some conflicts pose such a 
grave threat to our broader interests and values that conflict intervention may be needed 
to restore peace and security.”281 Furthermore, the report argued that, 
“Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, 
armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces of several nations 
working together under appropriate regional or international auspices.”282  
Interestingly, the United States did not support the requirement to obtain the consent of 
the country within which they intervene. It did, however, indicate a preference for using 
multilateral peacekeeping forces.  
Following its suggested collaborative framework, the United States co-sponsored 
a draft resolution with permanent members France and Great Britain, and other non-
permanent members in an effort to respond to the recommendations put forth by the 
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Secretary General.  On August 31, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1706 with 13 
countries in favour, and three countries abstaining. By evoking Chapter VII, the Security 
Council extended the UNMIS operations to include the Darfur region. The resolution 
provided the UNMIS with the authorization to use all necessary means, including force if 
necessary, to ensure protection of humanitarian relief efforts, assistance with the 
implementation of the DPA and the protection of civilians from violence. With the dire 
situation in Darfur, the resolution called upon its members to provide for a rapid 
deployment of a force of almost 20,000 military personnel and civilian police.283 In a 
surprising twist, the resolution did not directly include the requirement to obtain the 
consent from the Government of Sudan, but rather “invited” the consent.284 In other 
words, the resolution recognized the importance of the consent, but provided for the 
transition to occur without the consent.  
Taking into consideration the Chinese stance on the issue, it was expected that the 
Chinese delegation would veto a resolution that did not specify the need to obtain consent 
from the Government of Sudan for the transition.285 Though China did not veto the 
resolution, China did show its discontent by abstaining from the vote. Explaining China’s 
decision to abstain, Mr. Wang Guangya, presented the reasoning;  
“...[W]e have consistently urged the sponsors to clearly include ‘with the consent 
of the Government of National Unity’ in the text of the resolution, which is a 
fixed and standardized phrase utilized by the Council when deploying United 
Nations missions. We also urged the sponsors to carefully reconsider the timing 
of the vote. Regrettably, they failed to earnestly heed China’s sincere efforts. Due 
to our principled reservations on the timing of the vote and on the text itself, 
China could not but abstain from the voting.”286 
 
In summary, China would have preferred for the Security Council to delay the vote on the 
resolution until it had secured the consent from the Government of Sudan. China did not 
see the urgency as some of the other members, though the AMIS force was to be pulled 
out within the next month if no transition plan was approved and the humanitarian 
situation in Darfur had recently taken another turn for the worse.  
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The United States was one of the members of the Security Council that 
recognized the urgency of the resolution. In addressing the Security Council, the United 
States Ambassador Bolton argued that it was “imperative” that the UN “move 
immediately to implement it [the resolution] fully to stop the tragic events unfolding in 
Darfur.”287 Ambassador Bolton went on to describe an ongoing supreme humanitarian 
disaster occurring in Darfur, to which he referred to as a genocide. In the wake of such a 
disaster, he indicated that the Security Council “cannot afford to delay” and, of the 
resolution, we must “devote all of our energies to securing its immediate and full 
implementation.”288 The United States was obviously not concerned with the language 
used in the resolution, as the American official was pleased to see that “the Security 
Council upheld its responsibility and adopted a strong resolution.” 289 The United States 
did not see the necessity to seek the approval of the Government of Sudan to proceed 
with the implementation of the resolution and the transition of the peacekeeping 
operation.  
5.3 Resolution 1769  
Unfortunately, the Government of Sudan did not recognize the urgency to 
implement the Resolution 1706.  When the September deadline for the AU withdrawal 
had passed, there was still no agreement regarding the transition. The AMIS operation 
was struggling in Darfur as the situation continued to deteriorate to “unprecedented 
levels.”290 The UN relationship with the Government of Sudan was also under 
considerable pressure. In October, the UN Special Representative for Sudan, Jan Pronk 
was expelled by the Government of Sudan for writing about the government’s operations 
in Darfur.291 President Omar al-Bashir had also released statements to the media arguing 
that the UN transition plan was an American influenced plot to take over its oil and 
resources. If the UN decided to deploy their forces without the consent from the 
government, the president threatened to order attacks on the UN soldiers.292  
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The Secretary General continued his diplomatic efforts by hosting a high level 
consultation meeting in Addis Ababa in November for all the partners, including the 
Government of Sudan, the permanent five members of the Security Council (P5), and the 
AU. At the meeting, the Secretary General proposed a new peacekeeping plan. The plan 
suggested that the UN would first provide support for the AMIS operation, while the 
long-term plan was for the AU and the UN to jointly lead the mission in a hybrid 
operation. All partners approved the new hybrid force in principle, including the 
Government of Sudan.293 Although there was no agreement of the structure or strength of 
the hybrid force, it was agreed that the force would stay “predominantly African in 
character.”294 All these details would have to be agreed upon before a new resolution 
could be put forth for a vote in the Security Council. Although no immediate resolution 
was put forth, the Security Council released a presidential statement on December 19, 
2006 in support of the decisions made at the Addis Ababa meeting, and also called for the 
immediate deployment of UN forces to supplement AMIS.295 By January 2007, the UN 
had started their first phase of the plan, which included providing support to the AMIS 
operations. Nonetheless, there was still no official agreement regarding the hybrid 
operations. The Government of Sudan was continuously ignoring UN letters and its 
proposals on how to structure the hybrid force. The Government of Sudan again seemed 
to deliberately prevent the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Darfur.296   
By March 2007, tensions were increasing in the Security Council on the 
postponement of the deployment of the hybrid operation. The United States, along with 
the United Kingdom, argued for increased political pressure and a deadline by which the 
Government of Sudan needed to respond. At the same time, China, Russia, Qatar and 
Indonesia argued for patience as they believed that all details of the hybrid operations 
needed to be agreed upon by the Government of Sudan before any decisions were 
made.297 Not willing to wait for the Security Council to react, the United States imposed 
unilateral sanctions against Sudan, and urged the other Security Council members to take 
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similar action.298 Nonetheless, the Security Council was not able to agree on a joint action 
and ended up waiting for the Sudanese approval that finally came on June 12, 2007 after 
the hybrid plan had been altered to appease the Government of Sudan. The revised plan 
gave the AU control over day-to-day operations, and the UN control over the overall 
peacekeeping mission.299 Although the approval was welcomed, it was welcomed with 
caution by those who noted Khartoum’s unreliable promises. The Security Council 
needed to act while the Government of Sudan was acting collaboratively.     
As the tensions in the Security Council were already high because of the delayed 
peacekeeping operation and the Government of Sudan’s unwillingness to collaborate, the 
Security Council needed to agree quickly on a draft resolution for the newly agreed upon 
hybrid force. The United Kingdom took the initial lead and circulated a drafted resolution 
that proposed the establishment of the AU and UN Hybrid force, UNAMID, including 
size, mandate, structure and timelines. The draft resolution also included the threat of 
sanctions if the Government of Sudan did not comply with the resolution. Although the 
resolution was supported by the United States and some other members (the United 
Kingdom and France), it was not welcomed by China, Russia and Third World states 
(Qatar, Indonesia and African members) that had called for patience towards the 
Government of Sudan. The opposition argued against the resolution, not only because of 
the threat of sanctions, but also because of the use of Chapter VII authorizing the use of 
force if necessary.300 A second draft was circulated again two weeks later. The revised 
draft had removed the threat of sanctions, but still included the use of Chapter VII. After 
much negotiation and political pressure from high level officials, the draft resolution was 
brought to a vote on July 31, 2007 and was approved unanimously by all members of the 
Security Council.  
The decision by China to not only let the resolution pass, but to vote in favour of 
it, took some people by surprise. The Chinese official, Mr. Wang Guangya, explained 
that China had managed to obtain what it wanted in the resolution. First, the Security 
Council had waited to draft a resolution until they had received the consent from the 
Government of Sudan. Second, there were no compliance threats for the Government of 
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Sudan included in the resolution.301 In essence, the worst threats against the Government 
of Sudan’s sovereignty had abated. China was also pleased with the process for the 
resolution that secured the consent of the Government of Sudan through “dialogue and 
consultation” before Security Council decisions were made.302 Following this process 
reflects a “commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan.”303 The 
Chinese official also expressed much satisfaction with the Government of Sudan’s 
willingness to cooperate and to find a solution to the issues at hand, although it took the 
Security Council almost a year to gain consent.  
The United States did not maintain the same positive attitude as China towards 
resolution 1769 or the Government of Sudan. The United States had been arguing for a 
tougher stance against Sudan’s indecisiveness. According to the United States, the 
resolution did not include strong enough language to enforce the Sudanese Government 
to comply. Nonetheless, the United States Ambassador Khalilzad, expressed some 
satisfaction with keeping Chapter VII in the resolution. By evoking Chapter VII, the 
United States believed the peacekeeping force would be better prepared to support the 
DPA, including the use of force if necessary.304 The United States argued that the success 
of the resolution would depend on the Government of Sudan, and its decision to follow a 
path of “cooperation or defiance.”305 If the Government of Sudan decided to follow the 
latter, the United States threatened to “move for the swift adoption of unilateral and 
multilateral measures.”306 In other words, the United States promised to react to 
noncompliance by the Government of Sudan, even though the resolution did not include 
this language. The United States was sending a strong message in which they believed 
the Government of Sudan had no right to delay or deny the peacekeeping force to enter 
Darfur even if this would breach their sovereign rights.  
The approval of Resolution 1769 was not followed by swift implementation. The 
Government of Sudan continued to deliberately delay the deployment of UNAMID 
operations by objecting to the suggested composition of the UNAMID forces. The UN 
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was working hard to gain commitments from countries to assist with the mission, but as 
commitments were delivered, the Government of Sudan would object. Troops from 
Norway, Sweden, Nepal and Thailand were all denied access to Sudan in preference for 
African troops, while African countries were unable to commit more forces.307 The 
Government of Sudan did accept Chinese forces, although they were rejected by the rebel 
forces for not being neutral to the conflict. The government also put forth unrealistic 
demands such as advanced notice of all UNAMID movements and the power to shut 
down UNAMID communications and flights on short notice.308 The Security Council was 
again faced with the Government of Sudan being reluctant to cooperate or facilitate the 
peacekeeping deployment process.   
 
5.4 Resolution 1828 
Resolution 1769 provided a timeline that required the UNAMID deployment to be 
completed by December 31, 2007, and for UNAMID to take over command on January 
1, 2008.309 When Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations, reported to the Security Council February 8, 2008 regarding the status of 
UNAMID, only about 7,000 of the authorized 20,000 troops were deployed.310 Mr. 
Guéhenno reported the under-resourced mission was struggling to protect the civilian 
population with the high level of violence and unlawfulness occurring in Darfur. One of 
the reasons for the delay was the issue of force composition. As noted by Mr. Guéhenno, 
the agreement was to compose a force “predominantly African,” but not “exclusively 
African.”311 UNAMID was also reported to be struggling as a result of restrictions on 
movement and Khartoum objecting to, and blocking the movement of transportation 
equipment.  
In response to the report by Mr. Guéhenno, China urged the international 
community to support the UNAMID mission by providing resources and equipment. 
China was one of the first countries to arrive in Darfur, and has committed 80 million 
Yuan (valued at approximately $12 million USD) for the mission. In this regard, China 
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argued that they have been a “responsible member of the international community” that 
has been working to find a solution to the conflict in Darfur.312 While China did not put 
any pressure on Sudan in its statement, the United States continued its pressure on the 
Sudanese government. The United States argued that the Government of Sudan needed to 
facilitate the deployment as soon as possible, and if they would be unwilling to do so the 
Security Council would have to “consider appropriate action to ensure compliance.”313 
The United States asked the international community to increase their commitment to the 
mission, and pointed out that it had committed $140 million USD for UNAMID 
equipment and training.314Although the United States had some support within the 
Security Council to take action against the Government of Sudan for its failure to 
comply, there was no official reaction from the Security Council after the UNAMID 
report submitted by Mr. Guéhenno. It is interesting to note that the United States co-
initiated with Canada a movement outside the Security Council to ensure better support 
for UNAMID. The group, named Friends of UNAMID, decided to support the 
deployment process and coordinate financial contributions for the mission. Belgium, 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the United Kingdom and 
the European Union also joined the group, and were to hold regular planning meetings.315 
The Friends of UNAMID would become essential for the delivery of equipment, training 
of forces and technical support in the next months.316 The group reflected a willingness 
by the international community to react outside the Security Council when the Security 
Council’s efforts were not meeting expectations. 
By July 2008, the discussions on UNAMID heated up again, as it was time to 
discuss the renewal of the UNAMID mandate and Resolution 1769. The UNAMID was 
still struggling with less than half of its authorized forces while the situation continued to 
deteriorate. In the month of July alone, eight UNAMID troops were killed, and 19 
wounded.317  The mission was also still plagued by the lack of transportation and 
movement, which were still somewhat influenced by Khartoum’s bureaucratic processes. 
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With the ICC issuing the arrest warrant for the Sudanese President on July 14, tensions 
further increased with Sudanese officials threatening the safety of the UNAMID troops 
and humanitarian aid workers.318 The Security Council was again divided between its 
traditional fault lines. Some members of the Security Council urged a renewed resolution 
that included measures for compliance, while others requested patience and caution. The 
release of the presidential arrest warrant also added to the debate whether the resolution 
to renew the UNAMID mission should also include language about suspending the ICC 
rulings. The final draft submitted by the United Kingdom would include language 
voicing concern regarding the ICC arrest warrant and a promise to review this issue 
further.319 The draft also renewed the Security Council’s commitment to UNAMID and 
the DPA until July 2009, with a promise to have at least 80 percent of UNAMID forces 
deployed by the end of 2008. 
Resolution 1828 was approved with 14 votes in favor on July 31, 2008. The 
United States decided to abstain from the vote because of the language regarding the 
ICC.320 However, the United States did welcome and strongly support the renewal of 
UNAMID in Resolution 1828.321 The United States representative Wolf set forth four 
points concerning the American continued support for UNAMID. First, the United States 
voiced its willingness to take “additional measures” to ensure UNAMID would be 
deployed as soon as possible. Second, the United States believed that the Security 
Council had “fallen far short of our responsibility to protect” the people of Darfur.322 The 
United States urged the UN and others to redouble its commitment, and for the UN to 
improve its infrastructure to ensure rapid deployment of troops.323 Thirdly, the United 
States urged the Government of Sudan to do what it could to facilitate the deployment 
process; comply with the UN agreements and resolutions; and also take responsibility for 
the security and safety of UNAMID personnel within Sudan. Lastly, the United States 
assured that it would continue to support the peace process and all efforts to reach a 
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peaceful agreement.324 In review of the points made by the United States, it is obvious 
that they see a certain urgency to have the peacekeeping troops deployed, while 
recognizing an American sentiment that both the UN and the Government of Sudan 
should be doing more to facilitate the deployment. It is also interesting that the United 
States made note of the responsibility of a state to protect, but also the responsibility of 
the international community to protect when a state was unwilling or unable to do so.  
In complete opposition to the statement by the United States, the Chinese 
representative, Mr. Wang Guangya, celebrated the progress made by Sudan, and “the 
generous assistance by the international community,” that had encouraged peace and 
development in Darfur and Africa.325 As previously mentioned by China, the key to 
successful peacekeeping missions is the dialogue and political negotiations. Furthermore, 
China reflected on the overall features of a successful peacekeeping mission;  
“The successes and failures of international peacekeeping operations in recent 
years have shown repeatedly that a basic prerequisite for the success of any 
international peacekeeping mission is to seek the appreciation and cooperation of 
the Government and the people of the country concerned. Without that 
prerequisite, international peacekeeping operations, no matter how meticulously 
designed, can experience setbacks and even failure.”326 
 
In other words, what China sees as being important for a successful peacekeeping 
mission is to obtain the consent from a government to enter. In this regard, the 
peacekeeping mission in Darfur has been successful, even though it had almost been two 
years since the UN first approved a UN peacekeeping troop to enter Darfur. During this 
two-year period, the Government of Sudan had managed to maintain its authority 
concerning who would enter the country and how they would move about within the 
country. 
During the Fall of 2008 and the Spring of 2009, most of the UNAMID operation 
discussions occurred in coordination meetings known as the Tripartite Mechanism that 
include participants from the Government of Sudan, the UN and the AU. The 
negotiations were largely successful during the first months as the Government of Sudan 
seemed to have taken a more positive attitude towards the mission and started to more 
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actively assist with the mission. In an unprecedented move, the Sudanese government 
allowed for UNAMID movement, night flights, more security support for UNAMID 
convoys and expedient processing of visas for UNAMID personnel.327 While the 
Sudanese renewal of collaboration efforts improved the overall movement of troops, 
there was still a need for more troops to be deployed.  The deadline was to have 80 
percent of the UNAMID troops deployed by the end of 2008, but at the beginning of 
January only 58 percent of the troops were deployed and the troops were still missing 
crucial transportation equipment. The operation had also experienced serious losses with 
22 troops killed. 328 There was an obvious need to increase the troops, not only to ensure 
the security of the people of Darfur, but also the security of the troops.  
With UNAMID operation discussions occurring outside the Security Council, the 
discussion on the topic of Darfur in the first half year in 2009 focused mainly on the ICC 
arrest warrants and the expulsion of the humanitarian organizations. On July 24 the 
Security Council received the Secretary General Report on UNAMID for April to June 
by Mr. Alain Le Roy, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. Mr. Le 
Roy reported troop presence with almost 75 percent of the troops deployed. The 
Government of Sudan was still attending the coordination meetings, but had started to 
refuse expediting some visas. Although the report was relatively positive about the 
progress made with troop deployment of in Darfur, Mr. Le Roy offered some sobering 
words.   
“It has been more than five years since the Council first addressed this crisis. 
While the situation on the ground has changed, we are in many ways no closer to 
a solution now than we were when the issue was first taken up by this body. This 
is deeply distressing because of the human suffering that has occurred in the 
intervening years.”329 
After the report, the Security Council voiced its support for renewing the mandate of 
UNAMID that was expiring in two weeks. With a new resolution being drafted, Libya 
suggested that it should include language that the Security Council did not support the 
ICC and its recently released arrest warrant for the Sudanese President.330 Libya did not 
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receive any support for this suggestion, and China became an unlikely voice to speak 
against the suggested language. China argued that “this time, the draft resolution 
renewing UNAMID’s mandate will be focused and not revisit controversial issues so as 
not to undermine cooperation among the parties.”331 Resolution 1881, to extend the 
UNAMID mission, was approved unanimously on July 31, and no official statements 
were submitted after the vote.332 There were no major discussions or decisions regarding 
the peacekeeping mission in the Security Council in the remaining months of 2009. At 
the end of 2009, UNAMID had over 15,000 troops in Darfur, but was still struggling to 
gain security in the region and to protect the Darfur population.  
5.5 Conclusion  
In the case of Darfur, the Security Council joint actions have reflected an 
unwillingness to enter Sudan without its consent. This approach complimented Chinese 
policy, but was in opposition to the American policy. China has, during Security Council 
discussions on the topic of Darfur, continued its firm policy on peacekeeping missions for 
which it insists on respecting state sovereignty and receiving consent before entering a 
country. No issues managed to distract China from its policy, including the Government 
of Sudan’s non-compliance with the resolutions, the breaching of several agreements or 
the deliberate delaying of the deployment of the peacekeeping forces. The Chinese policy 
has in effect continuously regarded state sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention higher than humanitarian concerns in Darfur. The United States, on the other 
hand, continuously stressed the humanitarian urgency in Darfur. The American 
conviction in the humanitarian urgency was so strong that they were willing to act 
without the Security Council when they found the Security Council actions insufficient. 
The United States also wanted the Security Council to take a tougher stance on non-
compliance and breaches by the Government of Sudan. The United States did not see it 
necessary to wait for the Government of Sudan’s consent, and wanted to ignore the rights 
Sudan had has a sovereign power. In essence, the United States argued that they 
abandoned these rights by failing to protect their own citizens. Nevertheless, the United 
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States could not convince the Security Council to deploy the peacekeeping force without 
the consent present.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This thesis set out to provide insight on views of state sovereignty in 
contemporary international relations by investigating and comparing the different 
perspectives and arguments of China and the United States in the Security Council 
concerning the Darfur crisis between 2004 and 2009. The investigation was divided into 
three parts to accord with three different types of resolutions proposed and/or passed 
concerning the Darfur situation: those implementing sanctions; those referring matters to 
the ICC; and those concerning the deployment of peacekeeping forces. These three 
sections highlighted patterns of decision-making with regards to state sovereignty. I turn 
now to discuss the implications of Chinese and American decision-making processes and 
insights into how these patterns reflect the role of state sovereignty in international 
relations.  Finally, I will provide recommendations for future research to further clarify 
the understanding of state sovereignty in international relations.  
 
6.2 Patterns of Decisions-Making and State Sovereignty  
 The investigation into the official statements by China in the Security Council 
found that China consistently used state sovereignty to justify their stance on resolutions 
regarding the Darfur conflict. The Chinese used the principle of state sovereignty to 
justify why China could never officially support any of the imposed sanctions, the 
referral of the Darfur conflict to the ICC, or the deployment of the peacekeeping mission 
without the consent of the Government of Sudan. Though China never officially vetoed a 
resolution, China continuously worked behind the scenes to ensure that the language in 
the resolutions was weakened so the breach of sovereign rights was lessened. China never 
publically supported the reports that the Government of Sudan was one of the 
perpetrators of the atrocities in Darfur or publically pressured the Government of Sudan 
to obey resolutions. China did soften its language somewhat by encouraging the 
Government of Sudan to collaborate with the Security Council during a short period in 
2008. The slight change of tone in official statements was most likely the result of 
heightened international pressures surrounding the Summer Olympics hosted by China. 
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However, international pressures were never successful with changing the overall 
Chinese official stance that was determined to maintain the sovereign rights of Sudan. 
According to China, its strong commitment to state sovereignty was grounded in a deep 
commitment and belief in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence).333 The 
five principles reflect a commitment to the traditional principles of state sovereignty, 
including the belief that states are the supreme authorities and decision makers in 
international relations.  
In the case of Darfur, China’s respect for sovereignty better maintained and 
safeguarded its national interests. China continued to be the primary importer of 
Sudanese petroleum, and also become Sudan’s main foreign investor and military 
equipment exporter. China also purposely breached several sanctions imposed by the 
Security Council by selling military equipment to Sudan. The well-established bilateral 
relationship between Beijing and the Government of Sudan was never threatened because 
of China’s consistent approach to safeguard Sudanese sovereign rights. The Chinese 
became the Sudanese main savior in the Security Council. In essence, the Chinese actions 
demonstrated that they valued the relationship with Sudan higher than their commitment 
to the Security Council and the approved resolutions. However, China did recognize the 
impact the resolutions could potentially have in Sudan as China purposely delayed 
discussions and weakened the language in the resolutions.  
It is difficult to know whether China embraced the traditional meaning of state 
sovereignty because of their national interests in Sudan or if its deep commitment to 
traditional state sovereignty happened to support their national interests in the case of 
Darfur. Nonetheless, this thesis provides insight into how China uses state sovereignty as 
the main reason to justify their stance in the Security Council in the case of Darfur.  
Conversely, the United States recognized state sovereignty as the primary concern 
in the case of Darfur. While the Chinese always applied the same rigid application of 
state sovereignty, the United States evolved its application over the same period. At the 
start of the discussions of the Darfur conflict, the United States wanted to find a quick 
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solution to the conflict, but gave the Government of Sudan, as the sovereign power of the 
region, the responsibility to find a solution to the conflict. As the conflict worsened, the 
United States become more willing to ignore Sudanese sovereign rights as Sudan was 
purposely ignoring their responsibilities to protect the people in Darfur. The United 
States was often one of the principal sponsors of a resolution in the case of Darfur which 
reflects a significant effort to bring the conflict to the fore and onto the Security Council 
agenda.  The United States was also very vocal in its criticism of the Government of the 
Sudan as a perpetrator of what the United States described as genocide. In the end, the 
sovereign rights of the Government of Sudan were seen as less important than the 
urgency of the humanitarian disaster in the region. This was particularly evident as the 
United States argued that the international community did not need to obtain the 
Sudanese Government’s consent before deploying the peacekeeping force, although a 
military force within the border of another country is illegal and one of the most serious 
breaches of state sovereignty.  
In an unprecedented move, the United States supported the ICC to be the principle 
vehicle for achieving judicial justice in Darfur and tried to prevent other states within the 
Security Council from blocking the ICC prosecution of President Al-Bashir. Time will 
tell whether this will be the start of a new American approach to the ICC or a single-case 
scenario. The recognition of the ICC reflects a willingness to reinterpret the American 
stance on the ICC and the overall exercise of international law.  
Overall, this study found that the United States used a modern application of state 
sovereignty in the Security Council and its decision-making in the case of Darfur. In the 
modern interpretation of state sovereignty, the United States realized that the Government 
of Sudan as the sovereign power of Darfur had failed in its responsibility to protect its 
citizens and therefore had also abandoned its rights as a sovereign power. As a result, the 
United States argued that the international community had inherited the responsibility to 
protect the people of Darfur.  
In summary, this study found that state sovereignty is still at the core of the 
official foreign policies of China and the United States. However, China and the United 
States have applied two different interpretations of state sovereignty. The conflicting 
interpretations of state sovereignty complicated the decision-making process in the 
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Security Council and delayed a response to the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Although the 
United States was able to put Darfur on the agenda, China was able to influence the 
Security Council resolutions more than the United States, and as a result, the sovereign 
rights of the Government of Sudan were always protected and respected.  
The Chinese applied its cautious approach with a great consistency throughout the 
Security Council discussions. The United States’ approach was not conducive to either 
achieving results in the Security Council or maintaining bilateral relations with Sudan. 
China’s cautious approach, which was mainly focused on respecting the Sudanese 
sovereignty, was more successful in achieving both objectives. 
 
6.3 State Sovereignty in Contemporary International Relations 
It is apparent that state sovereignty plays an important role in contemporary 
international relations. In the case of Darfur, the Security Council resolutions were highly 
influenced by the interpretations of state sovereignty of its members, and this had 
tremendous implications for the ongoing conflict in Darfur. The investigation into the 
official stance by China and the United States also provides some general conclusions 
about the importance of state sovereignty in international relations.  
1. The concept of state sovereignty remains at the center of decision-making in 
international relations, and is therefore still a key building block of 
international relations.  
2. Interpretations of “state sovereignty” vary among states, which can delay 
decision-making processes in the Security Council.  
3. State authorities can use their rights as sovereign states as a barrier to effective 
international action to prevent atrocities and heinous crimes against humanity. 
4. The rights of sovereign states are protected more than individual rights of 
human beings.  
These general observations indicate the existence of an international community that is 
still defined by the traditional principles of state sovereignty, including non-interference 
into internal affairs and mutual respect for all sovereign states. 
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Although the United States applies a more modern interpretation of state 
sovereignty in its official statements in the case of Darfur, this was not reflected in the 
final Security Council resolutions. It should be mentioned that the modern interpretation 
by the United States reflects an influence by the R2P agenda, which was defined as the 
most profound challenge in the 21st century to international law and the traditional 
interpretation of state sovereignty. Nonetheless, China and others in the Security Council 
did not support the R2P agenda in their actions or resolutions. Therefore, there is no 
evidentiary support recognizing the R2P agenda being part of customary international 
law. The strong commitment to the traditional principles of state sovereignty reflects that 
R2P is not a profound challenge to state sovereignty at present.  
 The findings of this investigation also lead to important conclusion regarding the 
efficiency of the United Nations Security Council. In the case of Darfur, the Security 
Council has been rather unsuccessful in ending the violence and the atrocities. Although 
the structure and composition of the Security Council has in other cases been blamed for 
the inefficiency, the case of Darfur provides evidentiary support that it is the different 
interpretations of state sovereignty that has delayed the decision-making process. The 
lack of wording in international law on how to integrate the principles of state 
sovereignty into policies has created the opportunity for states to interpret and apply state 
sovereignty to match their own national interests. If the Security Council is to become a 
proficient protector of international peace and security there needs to be clear guidelines 
and policies developed to apply state sovereignty in international relations. However, 
states will most likely be reluctant to give up its current flexibility and powers as it is 
beneficial for national interests.  
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APPENDIX 
 
TIMELINE 
 
The United Nations Security Council and Darfur Discussions 
January 2005 to December 2009 
 
Date  Action 
May 25, 2004  - A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr Akram 
(Pakistan). The Statement expressed its grave concern over the deteriorating humanitarian 
and human rights situation in the Darfur region of Sudan.  
 
July 3, 2004  - A Joint Communiqué released by the UN and the Government of Sudan committing both 
parties to invest resources to end the escalating conflict in Darfur.  
  
July 30, 2004  - Resolution 1556 approved with 13 votes in favour and 2 votes abstaining (China and 
Pakistan). The resolution called on the Government of Sudan to fulfil immediately all of the 
commitments it made in the 3 July 2004 Communiqué. The resolution also decided that all 
member states shall prevent the sale or supply of arms to the Government of Sudan, the 
Janjaweed and the rebels.  
 
Sept 2, 2004  - Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 1556(2004) presented by Mr. Jan 
Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and head of the peace 
support operation.  
 
Sept 18, 2004  - Resolution 1564 approved with 11 votes in favour and 4 votes abstaining (Algeria, China, 
Pakistan and Russian Federation). The Resolution declared an intention to consider 
sanctions to obtain full compliance with the Security Council resolution 1556.  
 
Sept 20, 2004  - A closed meeting with Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Sudan. 
 
Nov 4, 2004  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Jan Pronk, Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and head of the peace support 
operation. 
 
Nov 18, 2004  - A closed meeting with Mr. Ahmed Aboul-Gheit, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt and 
Mr. Lazarus Sumbeiywo, Special Envoy for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) on the Sudan. 
 
Nov 19, 2004  - Resolution 1574 adopted with all votes in favour. The Resolution declared its strong support 
for the efforts of the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army to reach the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  
 
Dec 7, 2004  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Kieran Prendergast, Under-
Secretary- General for Political Affairs. 
 
Jan 11, 2005  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Jan Pronk, Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and head of the peace support 
operation. 
 
Feb 4, 2005  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Jan Pronk, Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and head of the peace support 
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operation. 
 
Feb 8, 2005  - Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Ali Othman Taha, First 
Vice-President of the Sudan; Mr. John Garang de Mabior, Chairman of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army;  Mr. Baba Gana Kingibe, Special Representative of the 
Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union in the Sudan; and Mr. Jan Pronk, 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan.  
 
Feb 16, 2005  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Ms. Louise Arbour, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.  
 
Mar 24, 2005  - Resolution 1590 approved with all votes in favour. The resolution decided to establish the 
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to support implementation of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement.  
 
Mar 29, 2005  - Resolution 1591 approved with 12 votes in favour and 3 abstaining (Algeria, China and 
Russia).  The resolution imposed travel bans and assets freeze on those impending the peace 
process in Darfur, and established a committee to oversee the implementation of the 
sanctions.  
 
Mar 30, 2005  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan. The meeting was delayed until the next day  
 
Mar 31, 2005  - Resolution 1593 approved with 11 votes in favour and four votes abstaining (Algeria, Brazil, 
China, United States of America). The Resolution referred the situation in Darfur since 1 
July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.  
 
May 12, 2005  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Hédi Annabi, Assistant 
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. 
- The Security Council applauded the African Union’s vital leadership role in Darfur and the 
work of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), and its decision to expand its 
mission to 7,731 personnel by the end of September 2005. 
 
June 29, 2005  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Luis Moreno- Ocampo, 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. 
- A closed meeting with Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal - 
Court.  
 
July 22, 2005  - Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur presented by Mr. Jan Pronk, Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of the United Nations 
Mission in the Sudan. 
 
Oct 13, 2005  - A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr Motoc 
(Romania). The Statement released expressed its grave concern at recent reports of an 
upsurge of violence in Darfur. 
 
Dec 13, 2005  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Luis Moreno- Ocampo, 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.  
- A closed meeting with Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court. 
 
Dec 21, 2005  - Resolution 1651 was approved with all votes in favour. The resolution decided to extend the 
mandate of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) until 29 
March 2006.  
- A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr. Thomson 
(the UK). The statement welcomed the commencement in Abuja, Nigeria, of the seventh 
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round of the African Union (AU)-led inter- Sudanese peace talks on Darfur, and expresses 
its appreciation to the African Union, the international community and the other donors. 
 
Jan 13, 2006  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Jan Pronk, Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of the United Nations 
Mission in the Sudan, and Mr. Salim A. Salim, Special Envoy of the African Union for the 
Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur. 
 
- A closed meeting with Mr. Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
the Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, and Mr. Salim A. Salim, 
Special Envoy of the African Union for the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in 
Darfur. 
 
Feb 3, 2006  - A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr. Bolton 
(the US).The statement commends the efforts of the African Union for successful deployment 
of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and for significant contribution to the 
provision of a secure environment for civilians and the humanitarian situation in Darfur.  
 
Mar 21, 2006  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Jan Pronk, Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of the United Nations 
Mission in the Sudan.  
 
Mar 24, 2006  - Resolution 1633 approved with all votes in favour. The resolution decided to extend the 
mandate of UNMIS until 24 September 2006. 
 
Mar 29, 2006  - Resolution 1665 was approved with all votes in favour. The Resolution decided to extend 
until 29 September 2006 the mandate of the Panel of Experts originally appointed pursuant 
to resolution 1591 (2005).  
 
Apr 18, 2006  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Salim A. Salim, African 
Union Special Envoy for the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur and Chief Mediator. 
- A closed meeting with Mr. Salim A. Salim, African Union Special Envoy for the Inter-
Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur and Chief Mediator. 
 
Apr 25, 2006  - A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr. Guangya 
(China). The Statement called for an end to the violence in Darfur, and call on all parties to 
the conflict to fulfil their commitments to conclude a peace accord in Darfur. 
- Resolution 1672 approved with 12 votes in favour and 3 votes abstaining (China, Qatar, 
Russian Federation). The Resolution decided to implement sanctions against 4 individuals 
involved in the Darfur Conflict.  
 
May 9, 2006  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Yahya Mahmassani, 
Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations.  
 
- A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr.Adada 
(the Congo).The statement released to welcome the agreement of 5 May 2006 reached at the 
intra-Sudanese peace talks in Abuja as a basis for lasting peace in Darfur. 
 
May 16, 2006  - Resolution 1679 approved with all votes in favour. The Resolution called upon the parties to 
the Darfur Peace Agreement to respect their commitments and implement the agreement 
without delay, and to strengthen AMIS’s capacity to enforce the security arrangements of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement.  
 
May 19, 2006  - Report on the situation in Chad and the Sudan presented by Mr. Jan Egeland, Under-
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.  
 91 
 
June 14, 2006  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Luis Moreno- Ocampo, 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Statements made by Sudan.   
 
- A closed meeting with Mr. Luis Moreno- Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court. 
June 29, 2006  - Report of the Security Council mission to the Sudan and Chad presented by Sir Emyr Jones 
Parry, in his capacity as head of the Security Council mission to the Sudan and Chad.  
 
Aug 28, 2006  - A closed meeting with Mr. Hédi Annabi, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations, and Mr. Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and 
Emergency Relief Coordinator. 
 
Aug 31, 2006  - Resolution 1706 approved with 12 votes in favour and 3 votes abstaining (China, Qatar, 
Russian Federation). The Resolution decided that the UNMIS’ mandate shall be expanded to 
Darfur, and therefore invites the consent of the Government of National Unity for this 
deployment.  
 
Sept 11, 2006  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by the Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi 
Annan.  
 
Sept 18, 2006  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Jan Pronk, Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of the United Nations 
Mission in the Sudan.  
 
Sept 22, 2006  - Resolution 1709 approved with all votes in favour. The Resolution decided to extend the 
mandate of UNMIS until 8 October 2006.  
 
Sept 29, 2006  - Resolution 1713 approved with all votes in favour. The Resolution decided  to extend until 
29 September 2007 the mandate of the Panel of Experts originally appointed pursuant to 
resolution 1591 (2005) and previously extended by resolutions 1651 (2005) and 1665 
(2006).  
 
Oct 6, 2006  - Resolution 1714 approved with all votes in favour. The Resolution decided to extend the 
mandate of UNMIS until 30 April 2007.  
 
Nov 22, 2006  - Report on the Situation in Africa (including Darfur) Briefing Mr. Jan Egeland, Under-
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.  
 
Dec 14, 2006  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Luis Moreno- Ocampo, 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.  
 
- A closed meeting with Mr. Luis Moreno- Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court. 
 
Dec 15, 2006  - A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr. Al-Bader 
(Qatar). The statement expressed grave concern regarding the increase in military activities 
of armed groups in eastern Chad, and concern over the continuing tensions between Chad 
and the Sudan.  
 
Dec 19, 2006  - A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr. Al-
Nassar (Qatar). The statement endorsed the conclusions of the Addis Ababa high-level 
Consultation on the situation in Darfur of 16 November 2006. 
 
Jan 16, 2007  - A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr. Churkin 
(Russian Federation). The statement expressed concern about the continuing instability 
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along the borders between the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic and about the 
threat which this poses to the safety of the civilian population and the conduct of 
humanitarian operations. 
 
Apr 23, 2007  - A closed meeting with troop-contributing countries to the United Nations Mission in the 
Sudan. 
 
Apr 30, 2007  - Resolution 1755 approved with all 15 votes in favour. The Resolution decided to extend the 
mandate of UNMIS until 31 October 2007.  
 
May 25, 2007  - A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr. 
Khalilzad (The United States). The statement  welcomed the transmission of the report of the 
Secretary- General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur, which contains recommendations regarding a mandate and a structure 
for the Hybrid Operation, details on the various components of the proposed operation and 
their specific tasks, and a description of the ongoing efforts of the international community 
to support the peace process in Darfur and to strengthen the African Union Mission in the 
Sudan (AMIS). 
 
June 7, 2007  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Luis Moreno- Ocampo, 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.  
 
- A closed meeting with Mr. Luis Moreno- Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court. 
 
July 31, 2007  - Resolution 1769 approved with all 15 votes in favour. The resolution decided to authorise 
and mandate the establishment of an AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID).  
 
Sept 28, 2007  - Resolution 1779 approved with all 15 votes in favour. The resolution decided to extend until 
15 October 2008 the mandate of the current Panel of Experts, originally appointed pursuant 
to resolution 1591 (2005) and previously extended by resolutions 1651 (2005), 1665 (2006), 
and 1713 (2006).  
 
Oct 2, 2007  - A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr. 
Christian (Ghana). The statement condemned the deadly attack on African Union 
peacekeepers in Haskanita, South Darfur, Sudan, reportedly committed by a rebel group. 
 
Oct 24, 2007  - A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr. 
Christian (Ghana). The statement released to welcomes the of peace talks on 27 October in 
Sirte, while expressing its strong concern at the continuing deterioration in the security and 
humanitarian situation in Darfur.  
 
Oct 29, 2007  - A closed meeting with troop-contributing countries to the United Nations Mission in the 
Sudan. 
 
Oct 31, 2007  - Resolution 1784 approved with all votes in favour. The Resolution decided to extend the 
mandate of UNMIS until 30 April 2008.  
 
Dec 5, 2007  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.  
 
Jan 9, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur. Executive Summary provided by the Under-Secretary-General 
for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno. 
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Jan 11, 2008  - A Presidential Statement released by the President of the UN Security Council, Mr. Ettalhi 
(Libya). The statement condemned the deadly attack on a UNAMID by Sudanese Armed 
Forces.  
 
Feb 8, 2008  - Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by the Special Envoy of the 
Secretary-General for Darfur, Mr. Jan Eliasson. 
 
Feb 19, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for the Sudan, Mr. Qazi Ashraf Jehangir. 
 
Mar 11, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur presented by Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
for the Sudan, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Edmond 
Mulet. 
 
Apr 22, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur presented by Mr. John Holmes, Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.  
 
Apr 24, 2008  - A closed meeting for troop-contributing countries to the United Nations Mission in the 
Sudan.  
 
Apr 30, 2008  - Resolution 1812 was approved by all members in favour. The Resolution extended the 
mandate of UNMIS until 30 April 2009.  
   
May 13, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan. A condemnation against attacks by JEM on 
Government forces was read by the President of the UN Security Council, Sir John Sawers 
(United Kingdom of great Britain and Northern Ireland).  
 
- Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur presented by Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-
General for Peacekeeping Affairs.  
 
June 5, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan. Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court provided a brief report.  
 
June 16, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan. The President of UN Security Council, Mr. 
Khalilzad (the United States), reads a statement prepared by Security Council on the referral 
to ICC.   
 
June 24, 2008  - Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Jan Eliasson, Special 
Envoy of the Secretary-General for Darfur, and by Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Special Envoy of 
the African Union for Darfur. 
 
July 16, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan. The President of UN Security Council, Mr. Le 
Luong Minh (Viet Nam), reads a statement condemning attacks against the UNAMID and its 
regrets for the death of peacekeepers. .   
 
Jul 31, 2008  - Resolution 1828 was approved with 14 in favour and one abstaining vote (the United 
States). The Resolution extends the mandate of UNAMID for a further 12 months to 31 July 
2009.   
 
Aug 18, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by head of the United Nations 
Mission in the Sudan, Mr. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi.  
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Oct 15, 2008  - Resolution 1841 was approved with all in favour. The Resolution extended the mandate of 
the current Panel of Experts (overseeing Arms embargo) until 15 October 2009.  
 
Oct 28, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur presented by Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations.  
 
Nov 5, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-
General for Peacekeeping Operations. 
 
Dec 3, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan by Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court.  
 
Dec 19, 2008  - Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur presented by Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations.  
 
Feb 5, 2009  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Mission in 
the Sudan. 
 
Mar 20, 2009  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Rashid Khalikov, Director of 
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.  
 
Apr 23, 2009  - A closed meeting for troop-contributing countries to the United Nations Mission in the 
Darfur.   
 
Apr 27, 2009  - Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur presented by Mr. Rodolphe Adada, Joint African Union-United 
Nations Special Representative for Darfur and head of the African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur. 
 
Apr 30, 2009  - Resolution 1870 was approved with all votes in favour. The resolution extended the mandate 
of UNMIS until April 30, 2010.. 
 
June 5, 2009  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. 
 
- A closed meeting to discuss Sudan (no specific topic elaborated on).  
 
June 11, 2009  - Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan presented by Mr. John Holmes, Under-
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.  
 
July 24, 2009  - A closed meeting for troop-contributing countries to the United Nations Mission in the 
Darfur. 
 
- Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur presented by Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations. 
 
July 30, 2009   - Resolution 1881 was approved with all votes in favour. The resolution extended the mandate 
of UNAMID as set out in resolution 1769 (2007) for a further 12 months to 31 July 2010. 
 
Oct 13, 2009  - Resolution 1891 was approved with all votes in favour. The resolution extended the mandate 
of the Panel of Experts (overseeing Arms embargo) until October 15, 2010.  
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Nov 30, 2009  - Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID) by Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations, and Mr. Djibril Bassolé, and Joint African Union-United Nations Chief 
Mediator for Darfur. 
 
Dec 4, 2009  - Report of the Secretary-General on Sudan by Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court.   
 
Dec 21, 2009  - Report of the Secretary-General on Sudan by Mr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African 
Union Commission, and Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Chairperson of the African Union High-Level 
Panel on Darfur.  
 
- A closed meeting followed to discuss the report provided by Mr. Ping and Mr. Mbeki.  
 
 
 
